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A HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR  
AFRICA, AND AFRICANS  
Frans Viljoen* 
he Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Protocol) entered into force on 
January 25, 2004.1  The highest organ of the Organization of 
  
 * Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa; 
Director of Academic Programs, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pre-
toria; co-editor of the African Human Rights Law Journal; E-mail: fvil-
joen@hakuna.up.ac.za.   
 1. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 10, 
1998 (entered into force Jan. 25, 2004) (By December 25, 2003, the required 
number of ratifications (fifteen) had been deposited; the Protocol entered into 
force thirty days thereafter, as provided for in art. 34(3) of the Protocol.) [here-
inafter Protocol to the African Charter], reprinted in 7 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 419 
(1999), http://www.africa-union.org/home/welcome.htm; African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 21, 1986, art. 66, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (art. 66 allows for “Spe-
cial protocols or agreements” to “supplement” the Charter) [hereinafter Afri-
can Charter].  See also THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: 
THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2000, 353 (Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray 
eds., 2002)  [hereinafter SYSTEM IN PRACTICE]; FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE 
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA 
FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 867 (2003); 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1999 (Christof Heyns ed., 2002) [hereinafter 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1999]; HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (Christof Heyns ed., 
2004) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS LAW].  See generally Julia Harrington, The 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2000 305 (Mal-
colm Evans and Rachel Murray eds., 2002); Ibrahim Ali Badawi Elsheikh, The 
Future Relationship Between the African Court and the African Commission, 2 
AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 252 (2002); Nico Krisch, The Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 58 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLANDISHCES 
ÖFFENLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERECHT 713 (1998); Makau Mutua, The African 
Human Rights Court: A Two–Legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342 (1999); Gino 
J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Reinforcing the African System of 
Human Rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, 16 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 431 (1998); Andreas O’Shea, 
A Critical Reflection on the Proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 285 (2001); Edward Kofi Quashigah, The African 
Court of Human Rights: Prospects, in Comparison with the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter–American Court of Human Rights, in THE 
 
T 
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African Unity (OAU), the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (Assembly), adopted the Protocol in July 1998, 
some five-and-a-half years earlier.2  The African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights (African Court or African Human 
Rights Court), after the election of eleven judges, is expected to 
start functioning in 20053 as an institution of the African Union 
(AU), which replaced the OAU in 2002.4  The goal of the African 
Court is to complement the protective mandate of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commis-
sion), which was established as the quasi-judicial implementa-
tion body of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter) in 1987.5   
  
AFRICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, TENTH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE 59 (A.V. Lowe, et al. eds., 1998); Nsongurua J. Udombana, To-
ward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than 
Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45 (2000) [hereinafter Toward the Afri-
can Court]. 
 2. O’Shea, supra note 1, at 286 n.6. 
 3. It is not certain when judges will be elected.  At its last session in July 
2004, the AU Assembly decided that the African Court and the AU’s Court of 
Justice should be “integrated into one Court.”  A report on the modalities of 
such a step must be submitted to the Assembly at its next meeting (around 
January 2005).  Assembly of the African Union, Decisions on the Seats of the 
African Union, 3rd Ord. Sess., Assembly/AU/Dec.45(III) (July 6–8, 2004), 
http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).  
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Protocol of the AU’s 
Court of Justice, adopted July 11, 2003, and requiring fifteen ratifications for 
its entry into force, had secured four (Comoros, Mauritius, Mozambique, and 
Rwanda) by July 31, 2004.  See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Rati-
fied/Acceded to the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, at 
http://www.africa-union.org/home/welcome.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).  
 4. On the transformation of OAU into the AU, see generally Konstantinos 
D. Magliveras & Gino J. Naldi, The African Union–A New Dawn for Africa?, 
51 INT’L  & COMP. L.Q. 415 (2002); Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of 
the African Union and Institution-Building in Postcolonial Africa, 16 LEIDEN 
J. INT’L L. 157 (2003), available at http://journals.cambridge.org (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2004); Corinne A. Packer & Donald Rukare, The New African Union 
and Its Constitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002).   
 5. African Charter, supra note 1; HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 7 (Christof 
H. Heyns ed., 1996); OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 803; SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 
supra note 1, at 353, app. 1.  For an explanation of the African Commission’s 
protective mandate, see Rachel Murray, A Comparison Between the African 
and European Courts of Human Rights, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 195, 196–97 
(2002) [hereinafter Comparison Between the African and European Courts].  
See also EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 22–25 (1996); Chidi Anselm 
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Rather than provide a comprehensive overview of the Proto-
col, this Article will focus on the role of individuals, referred to 
as “Africans” in the title, before the African Court. 6  I will ask 
the following questions: Do individuals have access to (including 
the standing to bring cases before)7 the new Court?  Will the 
new Court be able to overcome the African Commission’s weak-
nesses with regard to individual communications?  These ques-
tions will be explored in Parts II and III, and are framed by a 
brief historical introduction in Part I, while Parts IV and V dis-
cuss the broader legal context and some procedural issues bear-
ing on the benefits to individuals of the African Court.8  There 
are two reasons I chose the “individual” as the prism through 
which to view the Protocol.  First, individuals have emerged 
from the shadows of the Second World War into the spotlight of 
international law: exemplifying this trend are the recognition of 
individual rights in numerous human rights treaties, the accep-
tance of individual-complaint mechanisms, individual account-
  
Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures, 
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 235 (1998); OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 550–63; Frans 
Viljoen, Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System [hereinafter 
Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System], in HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW IN AFRICA 1998 128, 158–82 (Christof H. Heyns & Paul Tavernier eds., 
2001) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1998]. 
 6. The use of the word “Africans” in the title is not intended in an exclu-
sionary sense, but is chosen to underline the “human” (or “individual”) impli-
cations of the new institution.  Echoing the African Charter, the term “people” 
was not used because of the debate regarding its meaning.  State parties to 
the African Charter have obligations to non-African “individuals” within their 
jurisdictions, and nationality is not a general prerequisite for lodging com-
plaints with either the African Commission or the African Court of Human 
Rights.   
 7. “Standing” is used here in a broad sense, denoting “any right to appear 
as a party before an international court.”  Franz Matscher, Standing Before 
International Courts and Tribunals, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 594 (Max Planck Inst. for Comp. Pub. L. 2000).  
 8. “Individual” is used here in a broad sense, similar to its use in the 
phrase “individual complaints mechanism,” which distinguishes it from the 
phrase “inter-state complaints mechanism.”  In other words, “individual” in-
cludes groups of individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well 
as their legal and other representatives, such as their relatives.  The term also 
encompasses “person,” “author,” “applicant” and “complainant.”  As such, the 
term is broader than “victim,” a word avoided in this contribution because of 
its stigmatizing connotation of helplessness and powerlessness.   
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ability for grave human rights violations before the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
and the principle of universal jurisdiction.9  Second, it was 
mainly through individual complaints that the potential of the 
United Nations (UN) and regional human rights instruments 
has been unleashed, particularly in the African system.10  Put 
differently, the success of the African Court will be determined 
primarily by the way in which it deals with individuals as its 
natural and logical constituency. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
When the African human rights system was forged in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the possibility of an African human 
rights court was raised, but rejected.11  Participants in the draft-
ing process concluded that the continent was not yet ready for a 
judicial institution to make pronouncements on human rights 
violations committed by states.  In the introduction to the first 
document in the travaux préparatoires of the African Charter’s 
substantive provisions, the main drafter, Keba M’Baye, high-
lighted the omission of a judicial institution, but explained that 
it was “thought premature to [establish a judicial institution] at 
this stage.”12  Prophetically, he added that the “ideal is, no 
doubt, a good and useful one which could be introduced in the 
  
 9. See generally Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 462 (1998). 
 10. On the significant role and potential of NGOs in Africa, see, for exam-
ple, CLAUDE E. WELCH, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: ROLES AND 
STRATEGIES OF NON–GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995); Kwadwo Ap-
piagyei–Atua, Human Rights NGO’s and Their Role in the Promotion and 
Protection of Rights in Africa, 9 INT’L J. ON MINORITY GROUP RTS. 265 (2002).   
 11. See Keba M’Baye, Introduction to M’Baye Proposal, Draft African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1979, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/1, 
para. 4, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 65 (“The estab-
lishment of a Human Rights Court to redress cases of violation of human 
rights is not included in the Draft Charter.  It is thought premature to do so at 
this stage.  The idea is, no doubt, a good and useful one which could be intro-
duced in the future by means of an additional protocol to the Charter.”).  The 
only reference to a court in the later travaux préparatoires is the indication 
that a delegation proposed an amendment establishing an African court to 
judge crimes against mankind.  
 12. Id. 
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future by means of an additional protocol to the Charter.”13  In 
response to questions posed at the subsequent ministerial meet-
ing, M’Baye, as Chairman of the Committee of Experts, ex-
plained that the establishment of an African Human Rights 
Court was not a pressing concern because the Convention on 
the Elimination and the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid 
already provided for “an international penal court” and the 
United Nations was considering the establishment of “an inter-
national court to repress crime against mankind.”14  This ex-
change implies, therefore, that the proposed African Court was 
initially envisioned as an instrument to punish crimes against 
humanity, including apartheid.  An unnamed delegation pro-
posed the establishment of a court “to judge crimes against 
mankind and violations of human rights,”15 thus extending the 
possible material jurisdiction of such a court beyond crimes 
against humanity.  However, those at the meeting concluded 
that “it was untimely to discuss it,”16 and there is no indication 
that optional acceptance of a court’s jurisdiction – similar to the 
European compromise, which led to the establishment of the 
European Court of Human Rights (European Court)—was dis-
cussed.17   
  
 13. Id.   
 14. Organization of African Unity, Rapporteur’s Report of the Ministerial 
Meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt. Rpt (II) 
Rev. 4, para. 13 [hereinafter Rapporteur’s Report], reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 95.  
 15. Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 14, para. 117 (emphasis added).  
 16. Id.  
 17. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, (the European Court of Human Rights 
could only be established after eight states had accepted its optional jurisdic-
tion) [hereinafter European Convention], available at http://www. 
unhcr.md/article/conv.htm.  The European Convention was fundamentally 
revised after the adoption of Protocol No. 11 thereto, entering into force on 
Nov. 1, 1998.  See generally Council of Europe, Explanatory Report and Proto-
col No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, 
33 I.L.M. 943 (1994) [hereinafter Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11].  
Unless otherwise stated, all references to the European Convention in this 
article are to the 1950 version, not to its subsequent Protocols, because the 
African system’s structure more closely resembles the initial two–tiered sys-
tem in Europe (which included both the European Commission of Human 
Rights and European Court of Human Rights) than the current system (which 
includes only the European Court of Human Rights). 
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The inception of the African Charter can be traced to 1961, 
when a pan-African conference on the rule of law was held in 
Lagos, Nigeria.18  The conference, in “The Law of Lagos,” rec-
ommended that an African Convention on Human Rights be 
adopted and a court of appropriate jurisdiction be created.19  
Significantly, the conference consisted of judges, practicing law-
yers and law professors from 23 states, not merely of activists 
or NGOs.20  However, when the OAU was formed some two 
years later, judicial dispute resolution was not yet a priority 
and was, instead, overshadowed by preoccupations with sover-
eignty and territorial integrity.21  Under the 1963 OAU Charter, 
disputes were to be resolved by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government.22  The one legal institution provided for under 
the Charter, a legal committee, was never established.23   
This brief historical overview confirms that the establishment 
of the African Commission as a quasi-judicial body was deliber-
ate.  The African Commission was made unmistakably subser-
vient to the Assembly, its political master, to which it had to 
refer serious cases and report annually.24  The vague and insuf-
ficiently grounded individual complaint procedure in the Char-
ter was strengthened and secured by the African Commission’s 
Rules of Procedure and subsequent practice.25  States have, for 
  
 18. International Commission of Jurists, The Law of Lagos, para. 4 (Jan. 
1961), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 299. 
 19. Id. (statement formulated as an invitation to African governments “to 
study the possibility” of creating “a court of appropriate jurisdiction”).    
 20. Id. pmbl.   
 21. See Alfred Chanda, The Organization of African Unity: An Appraisal, 
21–24 ZAMBIA L.J. 1, 17–18 & 28 (1989–1992) (emphasizing the OAU Char-
ter’s focus on sovereignty and territorial integrity).   
 22. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. 
27, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 2 I.L.M. 766 [hereinafter OAU Charter], reprinted in THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: BASIC DOCUMENTS AND 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 (M. Hamalengwa et al. eds., 1988).  See generally 
Amadu Sesay et al., THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS (Yassin El–Ayouty & 
William I. Zartman eds., 1984) (for a general discussion and history of the 
OAU).  
 23. Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law-Making in Post–Colonial Africa: 
The Role of the Organization of African Unity, 49 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 81, 86 
(2002). 
 24. African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 58–59. 
 25. See Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, Doc. 
ACHPR/RP/XIX (1988) (amended June 10, 1995) [hereinafter Rules of Proce-
dure], available at http://www.hrni.org/files/instruments/HRNi_EN_926.html, 
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example, argued that only cases concerning massive or serious 
violations may be lodged with the African Commission.26  How-
ever, the African Commission has rejected such arguments, and 
remarked that its own practice has evolved to include individ-
ual complaints.27  Since its establishment in 1987, the African 
Commission’s mandate has been both promotional and protec-
tive.28  As part of its promotional mandate, the Commission has 
examined state reports, organized conferences, launched publi-
cations, and established Special Rapporteurs.29  Commissioners 
were assigned individual countries to which they have under-
taken promotional missions.30 From 1988 to 1992, the African 
Commission received 173 individual complaints, an average of 
fewer than twelve per year,31 and finalized ninety communica-
tions between 1988 and 2001.32  It has dealt with only one inter-
state communication, which still had not been finalized by the 
beginning of 2004.33  This does not compare favourably to the 
  
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1997 11 (Christof H. Heyns & 
Morne Van der Linde eds., 1999) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1997]. 
 26. Jawara v. The Gambia, Communication 147/95, 149/96, 13th Ann. Activ-
ity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, annex V, at 98, 
para. 12 (1999–2000) [hereinafter 13th Ann. Activity Report], available at 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../activity_repo
rts/activity13_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 27. Id. at 102, para. 42.  
 28. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 45 (sets out Commission’s general 
mandate).   
 29. Id.    
 30. Victor Dankwa, The Promotional Role of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 335, 341–44 (Michael Evans & Rachel 
Murray eds., 2002) (Dankwa, an African Commissioner, previously served as 
Commission Chair).  See also Distribution of State Parties Among Commis-
sioners, 15th Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Annex III, at 25 (2001–2002) [hereinafter 15th Ann. Activity Report].   
 31. These figures are based on my analysis of the Commission’s Annual 
Activity Reports, excluding those communications directed at non-state par-
ties.  Additionally, communications closely related to each other, either by 
content or by the state party complained against, have been counted together 
as one communication.  With these exclusions, the Commission’s official regis-
ter shows the receipt of 277 communications by the end of 2002.   
 32. “Finalized” denotes conclusion in a friendly settlement, or findings on 
admissibility and merits.   
 33. See 15th Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30, at 13 (stating Commis-
sion’s intention “to convene an Extraordinary Session to fully consider and 
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caseload before the European Commission of Human Rights 
(European Commission) in either the earlier or later part of its 
life cycle,34 but it does not significantly differ from the activity 
before the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC),35 the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (CERD Committee),36 or the UN Committee Against Tor-
ture (CAT Committee).37   
The idea of an African Human Rights Court took almost four 
decades to ripen into the Protocol adopted by the OAU Assem-
bly on June 10, 1998, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.38  The 
number of NGOs enjoying observer status with the African 
Commission had by then grown substantially,39 and the regular 
pre-session workshops provided a forum to raise support for the 
establishment of a court.40  Sessions of the African Commission 
became a forum where NGOs campaigned for a court.  Thus, 
pioneered by NGOs, supported by the African Commission, and 
  
examine” Communication 227/99, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, 
Rwanda and Uganda).   
 34. The European Commission dealt with 4,334 complaints in its first fif-
teen years of existence.  EUROPÄISCHE MENSCHENRECHTENKOVENTION EMRK-
KOMMENTAR 987 (Jochem Abr. Frowein & Wolfgang Peukert eds., 2d ed. 1996) 
(listing the complaints).  
 35. From 1977 to 1992, a sixteen year period, the HRC finalized some 240 
cases.  MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
CCPR COMMENTARY 900–13 (1993) (containing a list of communications). 
 36. Since its establishment in 1969, the CERD Committee has received 
seventeen complaints, twelve of which had been finalized by the beginning of 
2000.  See ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 467 (2000). 
 37. From 1988 through February, 2000, 154 complaints were registered 
with the CAT Committee and seventy-one have been finalized.  See BAYEFSKY, 
supra note 36, at 466.  
 38. See Ben Kioko, The Road to the African Court on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, in THE AFRICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 
TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 70 (1998) (discussing the drafting history of the 
Protocol).  
 39. By the end of 1994, some 140 NGOs had been granted observer status 
with the African Commission.  See Directory of NGOs with Observer Status 
(listing dates on which observer status granted), http://www.achpr.org/ 
english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).  
 40. Among the many NGOs present at these workshops, the International 
Commission of Justice (International Commission) was very influential.  It 
produced the first draft; although this draft was tabled at Cape Town, the 
International Commission’s Secretary General at the time, Adama Dieng, was 
a prominent figure in the process.   
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in receipt of high-level political backing,41 the movement for the 
creation of an African Court received the cautious support of 
the OAU Assembly in 1994.  At its meeting in Tunis, the As-
sembly asked “the OAU Secretary-General to convene a meet-
ing of government experts to ponder in conjunction with the 
African Commission … over the means to enhance the efficiency 
of the Commission in considering in particular the establish-
ment of an African Court.”42  This resolution came just as a win-
dow of opportunity opened up in Africa following the end of the 
Cold War.  Democratization swept the continent and led to 
multi-party elections, eventuating political change in Zambia, 
Benin, South Africa, and Malawi.43  Tentative attitudes towards 
judicial institutions have gradually been assuaged by the estab-
lishment and greater reliance on domestic constitutional courts, 
paving the way for acceptance of a continental court.44  The end 
of the Cold War also saw the proliferation of new international 
judicial mechanisms, linking the adoption of the Protocol to a 
global trend.45    
Government experts, mainly lawyers, met in Cape Town in 
September, 1995, and adopted the first draft Protocol (Cape 
Town Draft Protocol).46  The Cape Town Draft Protocol made 
  
 41. At the Commission’s fourteenth session in 1993, then OAU Secretary 
General Salim Ahmed Salim stated that the time had come for an African 
Human Rights Court.  See ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 70.   
 42. Resolution on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
13th Ord. Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
Organization of African Unity, June 13–15, 1994, OAU Doc. AHG/Rtes 230 
(XXX), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/resafchar30th.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 43. Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Democracy Forum 
Report 1997, ch. 1, at http://www.idea.int/publications/1997forumreport/cha 
pter1/chapter1.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 44. See Rainer Arnold, Constitutional Courts of Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries as a Dynamic Source of Modern Legal Ideas, 18 TUL. EUR. & 
CIV. L.F. 99, 103, 105, 114 (2003). 
 45. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal Sys-
tem of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 697 (1999). 
 46. Report of the Government Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/ 
EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT (I) Rev. 1 [hereinafter Report of the Government Ex-
perts], available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/refere 
nces/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHE
MENT%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p.170.doc (last visited 
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acceptance of direct access to the African Court by individuals 
an automatic consequence of ratification.47  After the Council of 
Ministers discussed the draft, the Council referred it to another 
meeting of government experts for further discussion,48 which 
took place in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in April, 1997, and cul-
minated in the second draft (Nouakchott Draft Protocol).49  This 
draft amended the Cape Town Draft Protocol in two significant 
respects.  First, the number of ratifications required for the Pro-
tocol’s entry into force was increased from eleven to fifteen.50  
Second, the Nouakchott Draft Protocol made optional a state’s 
acceptance of the African Court’s competence to receive peti-
tions directly from individuals.51  A third meeting of government 
legal experts, this time enlarged to include diplomats, then took 
place in Addis Ababa, culminating in the third draft (Addis 
Ababa Draft Protocol).52  The changes mentioned above are re-
  
Oct. 10, 2004).  The Cape Town meeting was organized by OAU General Se-
cretariat with the African Commission and “with the support of the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists.”  Id.  See generally Gino J. Naldi and Konstan-
tinos Magliveras, The Proposed African Court of Human and People’s Rights: 
Evaluation and Comparison, 8 AFR. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 944 (1996) (discussing 
the Cape Town Draft Protocol).     
 47. Art. 6 of the Cape Town Draft Protocol allows “individuals, non–
governmental organisations and groups of individuals” to bypass the Commis-
sion on “exceptional grounds.”  Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Cape Town Draft Protocol, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/ 
EXP/AFC/HPR (1), art. 6 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Cape Town Draft Protocol], 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%2
0LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%20OF%20THE
%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p.170.doc, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
1999, supra note 1, at 240. 
 48. Report of the Government Experts, supra note 46.   
 49. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Nouak-
chott Draft Protocol, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PRO (2) (Apr. 1997) 
[hereinafter Nouakchott Draft Protocol], reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
1999, supra note 1, at 259.  
 50. Id. art. 33(3).   
 51. Id. art. 6.   
 52. Draft Protocol to the African Chart on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Addis Ababa Draft Protocol, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) 
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flected in the Addis Ababa Draft Protocol, which was the last 
draft version promulgated before it was submitted to a Confer-
ence of Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General, where mi-
nor amendments were made.  The OAU Assembly then en-
dorsed it without amendment.53   
At its Twenty-fourth session in October, 1998, the African 
Commission urged member states to ratify the Protocol “within 
the shortest possible time.”54  In that year, however, only two 
states (Burkina Faso and Senegal) ratified the Protocol.55  For 
the next four years, the pace of ratification dropped to one coun-
try per year (Gambia in 1999, Mali in 2000, Uganda in 2001, 
and South Africa in 2002).56  In 2003, the pace accelerated, with 
nine states (Algeria, Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, 
Libya, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Togo) ratifying.57  By August 31, 
2004, four more states (Gabon, Mozambique, Niger, and Nige-
ria) had become state parties to the Protocol, thus increasing 
the total number of state parties to nineteen.58   
There are several factors that may have precipitated this ac-
celeration.  The African Commission persisted in prodding 
states to ratify, as evidenced by a call in May, 2002, urging “all 
OAU member states to ratify or accede as soon as possible to 
the Protocol.”59  In the late 1990s, human rights received strong 
backing from the OAU Assembly and Secretary-General.60  The 
  
 53. See id. arts. 34(3), 34(6). 
 54. Resolution on the Ratification of the Additional Protocol on the Crea-
tion of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 12th Ann. Activity 
Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, annex IV, at 28 
(1998–1999) [hereinafter 12th Ann. Activity Report]. 
 55. Id.  
 56. African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded 
to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at 
http://www.africa–union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions 
_%20Protocols/List/Protocol%20on%20the%20African%20Court%20on%20Hu
man%20and%20Peoples%20Rights.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Resolution on the Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, 15th Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30, annex IV, 
at 29. 
 60. See generally Kigali Declaration, May 8, 2003, AU Doc. 
MIN/CONF/HRA/Decl.1 (I). 
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OAU’s first ministerial conference on human rights in Africa 
was held in 1999, followed by a second (the first under AU aus-
pices) in May, 2003, in Kigali, Rwanda.61  The Kigali Declara-
tion notes “with concern” that only nine states had ratified the 
Protocol, and “appeals” to other states to follow suit, in particu-
lar “to enable [the Protocol] to come into force by July, 2003 as 
required by Dec. AHG/Dec. 117 (XXXVIII).”62  The sudden surge 
in acceptance may also be indicative of a spirit of greater com-
mitment to African unity and the development of the AU and 
its institutions.  The speed with which a simple majority of 
member states ratified the Protocol Establishing the Peace and 
Security Council63 and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing 
the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African 
Parliament exemplifies this trend.64  The institution of the first 
interstate communication forced governments to take notice of 
the African human rights system – it is more than coincidental 
that all three respondent states have ratified the Protocol.  On a 
more cynical note, some states may have been motivated pri-
marily by the prospect of bidding to host the African Court, an 
avenue open only to state parties to the Protocol.65  African en-
thusiasm and participation in establishing the ICC, and its en-
try into force in 2002, also left its mark on the parallel process 
of establishing the African Human Rights Court.66  
  
 61. Id. at 1. 
 62. Id. para. 26.  
 63. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union, July 10, 2002, AU Assembly, 1st Ord. Sess., art. 
22(5) (entered into force Dec. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Protocol Relating to Peace 
and Security Council], available at http://www.africa–union.org/home/ 
Welcome.htm. 
 64. Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community Relating 
to the Pan-African Parliament, Mar. 2, 2001, art. 22 (entered into force Dec. 
14, 2003), available at http://www.africa–union.org/home/Welcome.htm. 
 65. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 25(1).  
 66. African participation in the creation of the ICC has been significant.  
See generally Sivuyile Maqungo, The African Contribution Towards Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, in 8 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 333 
(2000).  The ICC Statute and Protocol to the African Charter both opened for 
ratification in 1998; the higher acceptance rate of the ICC Statute by African 
states is revealing.  By Oct. 19, 2004, twenty–six AU members had ratified the 
ICC Statute, slightly higher than the nineteen Protocol ratifications.  Coali-
tion for the International Criminal Court, States Parties to the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, at http://iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (last 
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II. COMPLEMENTING THE COMMISSION:  FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL 
TO JUDICIAL 
The overarching aim of the African Court is to supplement 
the African Commission’s individual communications proce-
dure.67  Therefore, the question is whether the African Court 
will be able to overcome the problems experienced by the Com-
mission in dealing with these communications.  Seven inter-
linked difficulties associated with the African Commission’s ef-
forts, most resulting from its status as a quasi-judicial body, are 
now discussed, and the African Court’s ability, as a judicial in-
stitution, to rectify these deficiencies is investigated.   
A. Nature of the Findings:  From Recommendatory to Binding   
The African Commission’s findings (or “reports”) are not con-
sidered final.  They are merely “recommendations” to the politi-
cal body that had given life to the African Commission, the 
OAU/AU Assembly.68  These findings become “final” only when 
they are contained in the African Commission’s Annual Activity 
Report and approved by the Assembly.69  This has weakened the 
impact of the African Commission’s findings by inhibiting state 
compliance.70   
  
visited Oct. 19, 2004); List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded 
to the Protocol, supra note 56.  Twelve states (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gabon, 
The Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa 
and Uganda) have ratified both, thus leaving fourteen states that have rati-
fied the ICC Statute but not the Protocol.  Id. 
 67. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 2 
 68. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 58(2) (note use of the term “rec-
ommendations”).  See also ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 74.   
 69. Whether the “adoption” of these findings by the OAU/AU “converts” 
them into legally binding decisions may depend on the legal force of those 
decisions.  Although it is still somewhat unclear whether OAU decisions are 
legally binding, AU decisions are.  Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the 
Union, 1st Ord. Sess., art. 33 (July 2002), http://www.africa–union.org/rule 
_prot/rules_Assembly.pdf.  See also Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, The Status 
of the Findings of the African Commission: From Moral Persuasion to Legal 
Obligation, 48 J. AFR. L. 1, 9–10 (2004); OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 9.    
 70. See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 2.   
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Conversely, the decisions of the African Court are final.71  
They will not be subject to appeal (to any other judicial institu-
tion) or to political confirmation (by any body of the OAU/AU).72  
The consequence is that these decisions will be unequivocally 
binding on state parties.73  State parties will not only “under-
take to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are 
parties,” but also to “guarantee its execution.”74   
B. Remedies:  From Uncertainty to Clarity   
The African Commission has no clear legal basis to create 
remedies, which has led to inconsistent treatment in the pun-
ishment of African Charter violations.75  The African Commis-
sion’s remedies may be divided into three categories:  no rem-
edy, a very open-ended remedy,76 and a specific, detailed rem-
edy.77  The omission of a remedy or the recommendation of an 
open-ended remedy leaves uncertain what is required of states, 
  
 71. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(2).  The only ex-
ception to finality is that the Court may review its own decision “in the light of 
new evidence.”  Id. art. 28(3).  Other international courts have the same ex-
ception.  See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, Rule 120(A), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV. 1 (1995) (Request for 
Review), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/240404/240404.pdf.  
See also Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR–97–19–AR72 (Mar. 
31, 2000), available at www.ictr.org.   
 72. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(2).  
 73. Id. art. 30. 
 74. Id.   
 75. African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 55–59 (provisions dealing with 
“other” (i.e., individual) communications make no mention of remedies).  See 
also Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 10 (discussing remedies).   
 76. There are several instances in which the Commission has recently 
found violations of the Charter, but left the issue of an appropriate remedy 
completely open by failing to stipulate any remedy.  See, e.g., Huri–Laws v. 
Nigeria, Communication 225/98, 14th Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, annex V, at 57 (2000–2001) [hereinafter 14th 
Ann. Activity Report]; Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leonne, Communication 
223/98, 14th Ann. Activity Report, annex V, at 43 (2000–2001).  
 77. See, e.g., The Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. and the Ctr. for Econ. 
and Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, 15th Ann. Activity Report, 
supra note 30, annex V, at 31 [hereinafter SERAC Case]; Communications 
Filed Against the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Communications 54/91, 
61/91, 98/93, 164/97–196/97, 210/98, 13th Ann. Activity Report, supra note 26, 
annex V, addendum, at 138 (Commission consolidated communications filed 
against the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and issued one ruling).   
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thus impeding follow-up or implementation.  For example, in 
Communication 224/98, Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, the 
respondent state was urged “to bring its laws in conformity with 
the provisions of the [African] Charter.”78   The African Com-
mission’s failure to define the term “in conformity” may have 
been one of the reasons for Nigeria’s non-compliance.  In con-
trast, there is a clear legal basis in the Protocol for the provision 
of remedies, allowing the African Court to make “appropriate 
orders to remedy the violation.”79 
C. Implementation:  From an Ad Hoc System to a  
Comprehensive System   
Given the non-binding nature of findings and the weak legal 
basis for remedies under the Charter, it is hardly surprising 
that implementation and enforcement of remedies has been 
weak.  The African Commission has not instituted any sort of 
compliance system to gather information about states’ re-
sponses to the African Commission’s findings.80  Without the 
required information, the African Commission has remained 
passive with respect to the consequences of its findings.81   
While the African Commission has adopted no systematic 
compliance mechanism,82 some Commissioners have undertaken 
limited follow-up on an ad hoc basis. The most notable example 
  
 78. Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Communication 224/98, 14th Ann. 
Activity Report, supra note 76, annex V, at 46.  
 79. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 27(1).  
 80. These insights are based on an evaluation of the activities of the Afri-
can Commission, undertaken by the author in 2001.  See Danish Centre for 
Human Rights, Strengthening the Core Activities and Secretariat of the Afri-
can Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Evaluations and Reviews of 
Partnership Programmes—No. 17, at 24 (2001), http://www.humanrights 
.dk/upload/application/a66525ef/eandr17.pdf.   
 81. The Commission has, for example, not established any systematic 
method for collecting information about states’ implementation of its recom-
mendations, nor has it developed any records regarding measures taken by 
states in compliance with its findings.  The Commission’s practice differs from 
that of the UN Human Rights Committee, which provides an annual report 
noting the status of state compliance with its findings.  Report of the Human 
Rights Committee, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 57th Sess., Ch. 6, Follow-
up Activities Under the Optional Protocol, at 118, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Vol. I) 
(2002), http://ods–dds–ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/668/60/IMG/N02668 
60.pdf?OpenElement.   
 82. See OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 657. 
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is Commissioner Jainaba Johm’s questions to state parties re-
garding their implementation of decisions on individual com-
munications during examination of state reports.83 Another ex-
ample includes a recommendation, made as part of a remedy, 
that the state party discuss implementation of the decision in 
its periodic report.84  Additionally, remedies ordered in other 
decisions imply that some sort of follow-up will be undertaken.85   
Conversely, state parties to the Protocol specifically under-
take to implement the findings, including ordered remedies.86  
Institutional or systematic control over enforcement is provided 
in that the Executive Council must be notified of judgments and 
must monitor their execution on behalf of the Assembly.87  In its 
annual report to the Assembly, the African Court must specify 
instances of state non-compliance.88  Non-compliance may result 
in an AU decision, which in turn may lead to the imposition of 
sanctions as envisaged under the AU Constitutive Act.89   
D. Accessibility:  From Secrecy to Openness   
Confidentiality obscures the protective work of the African 
Commission.  The requirement that “all measures taken” by the 
African Commission remain confidential until approved by the 
Assembly has been interpreted to include any information 
about individual communications.90  Sessions of the African 
Commission are therefore divided into public and private.91  The 
public portion of their sessions deals with promotional issues, 
  
 83. See generally 15th Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30, annex 1 (indicat-
ing that states’ reports were considered by the African Commission during its 
Thirty–first Ord. Sess.). 
 84. See Legal Res. Found. v. Zambia, Communication 211/98, 14th Ann. 
Activity Report, supra note 76, annex V, at 86 (remedy ordered). 
 85. See, e.g., SERAC Case, supra note 77.   
 86. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 30.  
 87. Id. art. 29(2). 
 88. Id. art. 31.   
 89. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/23.15, art. 23(2) (entered into force May 26, 2001) [hereinafter AU 
Constitutive Act], http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm. 
 90. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 59(1). 
 91. See Frans Viljoen, Introduction to the African Commission and the 
Regional Human Rights System, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 358, 
427 [hereinafter Introduction to the African Commission].  See generally 15th 
Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30 (for examples of Commission agendas).  
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including the examination of state reports; the private portion, 
which is closed to the public, deals mainly with communica-
tions.92  Because of this policy, decisions are often not accessible 
and are not widely disseminated.  Additionally, there is no sys-
tematic publication of the African Commission’s decisions.93  
This excessive confidentiality is one of the factors contributing 
to the low media profile and public awareness of the Commis-
sion in Africa.94   
On the other hand, court proceedings in most countries are 
usually open to the press and public;95 the African Court is no 
different.96  Although the Protocol includes an exception allow-
ing closed proceedings, in my view it is meant to be used only to 
protect witnesses in situations where individuals, complain-
ants, or witnesses are seriously threatened.97  A reasoned judg-
ment has to be “read in open court.”98  All AU members must be 
notified of decisions.99  However, no provision has been made for 
the publication of these reports; although such provisions 
should be covered in the Rules, there could be finance and re-
source implications. 100   
  
 92. See Viljoen, Introduction to the African Commission, supra note 91. 
 93. The Commission’s most recent decisions are accessible online, and are 
reported in the Commission’s Annual Activity Reports.  See www.achpr.org.  
Additionally, the Institute for Human Rights and Development, an NGO 
based in Banjul, The Gambia, has published a “Compilation of Decisions on 
Communications of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.” 
 94. See ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 38.   
 95. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMON LAW, COMMON 
VALUES, COMMON RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON OUR COMMON HERITAGE BY 
DISTINGUISHED BRITISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORS (2000) (discussing notions of 
procedural fairness in common law systems, as well as the importance of pub-
lic scrutiny in the common law system). 
 96. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(1).  See also 
Murray, Comparison Between the African and European Courts, supra note 5, 
at 215. The African Court’s Rules of Procedure should clarify under which 
circumstances in camera proceedings may take place.  “Proceedings” should be 
interpreted broadly to include court documents, such as pleadings; these 
should be publicly accessible on the Court’s web site.   
 97. See JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 195–96 (2003) (for an analysis of a similar 
exception in the Inter-American system).  
 98. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(5).   
 99. Id. art. 29(1). 
 100. Id. art. 28(6) (requiring that the African Court provide reasons for its 
decisions, but not requiring publication). 
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E. Pace of the Process:  From Delayed to More Immediate  
Justice?   
The African Commission also has serious problems with de-
lays in finalizing its communications.101  Often, a change of gov-
ernment has already taken place by the time the African Com-
mission has reached a finding and recommended a remedy.102  
For example, in the SERAC case, the delay between receipt of 
the communication and entry of the final decision was five 
years and seven months.103  To a very limited extent, the delay 
could be attributed to the state party because of its obstruction 
of the African Commission’s planned on-site mission to Nige-
ria.104  The complainant also contributed to the delay, as one 
postponement was made “pending the receipt of written sub-
missions from the Complainants.”105  However, most of the de-
  
 101. See generally Dinah Shelton, Ensuring Justice with Deliberate Speed: 
Case Management in the European Court of Human Rights and the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 21 HUM. RTS. L. J. 337 (2000).  Institutional delay 
was one of the main justifications for the transformation of the European hu-
man rights system.  The Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11, establishing a 
single European Court of Human Rights, describes the extent of the problem:   
The backlog of cases before the Commission is considerable.  At the 
end of the Commission's session in January 1994, the number of 
pending cases stood at 2,672, more than 1,487 of which had not yet 
been looked at by the Commission. It takes on average over 5 years 
for a case to be finally determined by the Court or the Committee of 
Ministers.  Also, whereas up to 1988 there were never more than 25 
cases referred to the Court in one year, 31 were referred in 1989, 61 
in 1990, 93 in 1991, 50 in 1992 and 52 in 1993, and it is probable that 
the number will increase even more in the next few years ... .  
Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11, supra note 17, at 948.  
 102. See Comité Cultural pour la Democratie au Benin v. Benin, Communi-
cation 16/88, 8th Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights, para. 2 (1994–1995) (The Commission decided that “the present 
government of Benin had satisfactorily resolved the issue of violations of hu-
man rights under the previous administration.”) [hereinafter 8th Ann. Activity 
Report], http: www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/ACHPR1.htm.  See also Degli 
v. Togo, Communication 83/92, 8th Ann. Activity Report, para. 5; Peoples’ De-
mocratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism v. The Gambia, Com-
munication 44/90, 10th Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, at 65 (1996–1997) [hereinafter 10th Ann. Activity Report]; 
Huri–Laws v Nigeria, 14th Activity Report, supra note 76, at 57. 
 103. SERAC Case, supra note 77. 
 104. Id.   
 105. Id. para. 16.  
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lays can be attributed to the African Commission: the discus-
sion of the Nigeria mission report and “lack of time” are cited as 
reasons why the case was postponed on only two occasions;106 
more disconcerting are the numerous unexplained postpone-
ments.107 
However, recourse to the African Court may mean more, 
rather than less, delay.  The supplementary nature of the Afri-
can Court necessitates some duplication.108  Both the African 
Commission and Court are required to deal with admissibility 
and substantive questions,109 unless a case is submitted directly 
to the African Court.110  The ability of complainants to make 
direct submissions to the African Court depends on whether a 
state has made an optional declaration to that effect; the decla-
ration is more the exception than the rule.111  However, once the 
African Court has deliberated on a judgment, it must render its 
written opinion within ninety days.112  Because state parties 
must comply with the African Court’s judgment “within the 
time stipulated by the Court,” the inference can be made that 
the African Court will set timeframes for compliance and that 
states will be required to abide by them.113  Nevertheless, re-
quiring separate arguments and findings for two different insti-
tutions — the African Commission and the African Court — will 
inevitably lead to delays.  These types of excessive delay were 
partially responsible for the merger of the European Commis-
  
 106. Id. paras. 18–19.  The mission took place from March 7–14, 1994; no 
final report has been adopted.  See also Viljoen, Overview of the African Re-
gional Human Rights System, supra note 5, at 181. 
 107. SERAC Case, supra note 77, paras. 21–32 (several postponements from 
the 24th to the 29th Session).  
 108. This argument has been crucial in transforming the European human 
rights machinery into a single judicial institution.  See generally CLARE OVEY 
& ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the integration of European human rights 
policies). 
 109. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3, 6. 
 110. Id. art. 34(6). 
 111. In fact, only one state party, Burkina Faso, has made such an art. 34(6) 
declaration.  See Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: the Next Critical Stage, Association for 
the Prevention of Torture, n.2, http://www.apt.ch/africa/court_judges.htm 
#_ftnref2 (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 112. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(1).   
 113. Id. art. 30.   
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sion and Court into one institution.114  This may well be the 
long-term solution for the African system if the coexistence of 
the African Commission and the African Court produces similar 
or even longer delays in finalizing cases.   
F. Urgent Cases:  From Inadequacy to Efficiency?   
The African Charter does not provide for the adoption of in-
terim or provisional measures.115  The  African Commission’s 
Rules of Procedure fill this lacuna by providing that the African 
Commission may inform a state party on the “appropriateness 
of taking provisional measures to avoid irreparable damage be-
ing caused to the victim of the alleged violation.”116  Such meas-
ures may be indicated by the African Commission or, when it is 
not in session or in cases of urgency, by the Chair, in consulta-
tion with other members of the African Commission.117  The 
Chair may take “any necessary action” in urgent cases, but 
must report to the African Commission about action taken at 
the next session.118  The African Commission has used this com-
petence in a limited number of cases.  For example, the African 
Commission, based on a communication it received regarding 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders, adopted interim 
measures asking the state (Nigeria) not to execute them until 
the Commission had made a decision.119  The Nigerian govern-
ment did not comply,120 and in its subsequent decision the Afri-
can Commission indicated that it considers interim measures 
binding on a state party.121  However, the African Commission’s 
regular procedure lacks a mechanism for dealing with commu-
nications of an urgent nature.122   
  
 114. See Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11, supra note 17, at 944. 
 115. African Charter, supra note 1 (no provisions for the adoption of interim 
measures). 
 116. Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, R. 111(1).   
 117. Id. R. 111(2). 
 118. Id. R. 111(3). 
 119. Int’l Pen v. Nigeria, Communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96, 161/97, 
12th Ann. Activity Report, supra note 54, at 65 (Communications consolidated 
because all concerned the trial and detention of Ken Saro-Wiwa). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 72–73. 
 122. The following communications illustrate that the Commission lacks a 
mechanism for dealing with urgent matters.  See Organisation Mondiale Con-
tre la Torture v. Rwanda, Communications 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, 10th 
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Under the Protocol, the African Court has a broad mandate to 
adopt “such provisional measures as it deems necessary” in 
cases “of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to 
avoid irreparable harm to persons.”123  The issue is whether the 
“adopted measures” are “judgments” that parties have under-
taken to execute to be monitored by the AU Executive Council 
on behalf of the Assembly.  The Protocol should be interpreted 
to include those measures.  “Findings,” as defined in Article 27 
(for example, a finding of violation, a remedy, or a provisional 
measure) are the dispositive part of the “judgment.”  The terms 
“finding” and “judgment” are not mutually exclusive.  The Afri-
can Court could clarify this apparent uncertainty by denoting 
its “finding” on provisional measures as a “judgment,” an ave-
nue followed in the other regional systems.124     
G. Profile:  From Obscurity to Visibility?   
Despite the vastness of the African continent and the fre-
quency of human rights reports and allegations, very few com-
munications have reached the African Commission.125  At the 
domestic level, many factors account for this small caseload, 
among them illiteracy, political instability or war, absence of 
civil society, lack of legal aid, lack of access to justice, onerous 
local remedies, dysfunctional court systems, and corruption.  
Commission-level factors are also responsible.  The African 
Commission has been ineffective in disseminating information 
about its existence and its case law126 and has failed to exploit 
  
Ann. Activity Report, supra note 102, at 49–56 (African Commission failed to 
issue findings on consolidated communications, submitted from 1989 to 1992 
alleging violations against members of the Tutsi group, until Oct. 1996, some 
seven years after submission of the first communication). 
 123. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 27(2).   
 124. Cf. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, at 506, ¶ 109 (June 
27) (where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that interim meas-
ures under art. 41 of its Statute are binding); Mamatkalov v. Turkey, App. 
Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 6, 2003), http://www. 
ehcr.coe.int/eng. 
 125. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.   
 126. See Danish Centre for Human Rights, supra note 80, at 43.  The Afri-
can Commission activated an official website and began publishing its deci-
sions on it in 2001, significantly improving the dissemination of information.   
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media exposure possibilities.127  Some of the Commission’s in-
adequacies, however, may be a result of its lack of resources 
and its seat in far-off Banjul.   
To some extent, the mere existence of the African Court 
should generate greater media interest and exposure.  A conti-
nental court is bound to have a much clearer identity in the 
minds of Africans.  Ultimately, however, the African Court itself 
will have earned its legitimacy by securing a high profile 
through the accessibility and transparency of its procedures, 
the quality of its judgments and the fairness of its findings.   
III. THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE THE COURT 
The coexistence of the African Court with the African Com-
mission means that Africa will have a two-tiered human rights 
system, similar to the Inter-American system and the European 
system before Protocol No. 11’s entry into force in 1998.128  The 
Protocol describes the relationship between the two bodies as 
complementary and mutually reinforcing.129  Although the Afri-
can Court may deal with individual and inter-state cases and 
has both contentious and advisory jurisdiction, this section will 
focus mainly on individual cases and contentious proceedings, 
where the rights of individuals are most at stake.130  The follow-
ing issues specifically affecting individuals before the African 
Court are discussed here: standing to bring cases and the in-
  
 127. See ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 38–39 (African Commission’s restrictive 
interpretation of confidentiality principle featured in African Charter, art. 59, 
contributes to public’s lack of exposure to, and resultant lack of confidence in, 
Commission decisions).  See also Danish Centre for Human Rights, supra note 
80, at 34–35 (“Generally, interviewees agree that this is the worst area of the 
Commissioner’s (and its Secretariat’s) work, and one in which very little pro-
gress can be[] identified.  The Secretariat has not … consistently secured the 
presence of journalists at sessions, and has not organised a workshop for jour-
nalists to promote the African Charter.”). 
 128. See generally Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11, supra note 17.   
 129. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, pmbl. & art. 2.   
 130. Although the African Court has jurisdiction over inter-state com-
plaints, states must still submit their complaints against other states to the 
Commission.  Assuming that the African Commission determines that the 
case is admissible and that there is a violation on the merits, the Commission 
or one of the state parties, either the state lodging the complaint or the state 
against which the complaint had been lodged, may submit the case to the 
Court.  Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(b) & (c).    
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volvement of individuals in proceedings before the African 
Court.   
A. Standing in Contentious Cases: Submission of Individual 
Complaints to the Court 
Article 5(1) of the Protocol allows the following parties to 
submit contentious cases to the African Court: “(a) The Com-
mission; (b) The State Party which has lodged a complaint to 
the Commission; (c) The State Party against which the com-
plaint has been lodged at the Commission; (d) The State Party 
whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation; (e) African 
Intergovernmental Organizations.”131  In addition, Article 5(3) 
provides that “[t]he Court may entitle relevant NGOs with ob-
server status before the Commission, and individuals to insti-
tute cases directly before it, in accordance with Article 34(6) of 
this Protocol.”132  Article 34(6) stipulates that “[a]t the time of 
the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State 
shall make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court 
to receive cases under Article 5(3).”133 
Thus, there are two roads leading to the African Court.  The 
main road runs through the African Commission.  Individuals 
are not allowed to lift the barrier (i.e., by “submitting cases”) 
that separates Commission and Court; the African Commission 
and the respondent state act as gatekeepers.  The second road 
leads directly to the African Court, and bypasses the African 
Commission.  However, only states may permit complainants to 
bypass the African Commission by making an Article 34(6) dec-
laration to that effect.134  So far, only one of the nineteen ratify-
ing states has made such a declaration.135  Because the optional 
declaration allowing direct access to the African Court is the 
exception rather than the rule, most cases reaching the African 
Court will start as communications to the African Commission.  
Once before the African Commission, however, individuals seem 
  
 131. Id. art. 5(1)(a)(b)(c) & (d).   
 132. Id. art. 5(3).   
 133. Id. art. 34(6).   
 134. Id. art. 34(6).   
 135. See Niyizurugero, supra note 111. 
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to lose the capacity to influence the fate of their cases and, as a 
consequence, to impact the African Court’s agenda.136   
If strengthening the complaints’ mechanism to overcome defi-
ciencies inherent in the African Commission’s findings is the 
rationale for establishing the African Court, then the Court 
should be allowed to play as important a role as possible.137  Put 
another way, as many communications as possible should be 
able to reach the African Court.  How appropriate is it, then, to 
rely on states against whom complaints have been lodged (re-
spondent states) and the African Commission to set the process 
in motion? 
1. Respondent States – Article 5(1)(c) 
Reliance on respondent states is unlikely to unleash the Afri-
can Court’s potential.  If the African Commission continues to 
favor individuals, states will probably “appeal” the African 
Commission’s findings before the African Court on the grounds 
that the African Commission violated the Charter.  If this hap-
pens in cases where the African Commission finds a violation by 
the state, the referral of matters to the African Court will de-
pend on the initiative of respondent states.  However, states 
may be reluctant to submit cases to the African Court because 
of the binding nature of its decisions.  In other words, states 
may prefer the certainty of a non-binding finding against them 
over the possibility of a binding decision against them.  More-
over, there seems to be little incentive for states prevailing at 
the Commission level to submit to a potentially disadvanta-
geous Court judgment.   
2. The Commission – Article 5(1)(a) 
Because individuals or NGOs who submit complaints have no 
competence to refer matters and states are unlikely to do so, it 
is left to the African Commission to refer matters.  The Inter-
American experience illustrates the risk of relying on the Afri-
can Commission to refer cases to the African Court.  Although 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American 
  
 136. Id.   
 137. See Murray, Comparison Between the African and European Courts, 
supra note 5, at 213 (arguing that the Court should be supplied with “a regu-
lar list of cases”).   
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Court) was established in 1980, it did not receive its first con-
tentious case until 1986,138 followed by its second in 1990.139   
Since the Protocol does not explicitly require that the African 
Commission make findings on the admissibility and merits of a 
case before submitting it to the African Court,140 three possibili-
ties present themselves.  First, the African Commission may 
submit a case to the African Court without making any findings 
at all.  Second, it could submit a case after making some find-
ings, for example, after it had made a finding of fact, a finding 
on admissibility, or after unsuccessfully trying to negotiate a 
friendly settlement.  Finally, the African Commission could 
submit a case to the African Court after its final disposition, 
i.e., a finding on the merits or a friendly settlement.  This Arti-
cle will now consider the following three Scenarios.   
Scenario 1: In the first scenario, the African Commission 
could act as a mere conduit to the African Court.  After a pre-
liminary hearing at the Commission level, the African Court 
could decide on both admissibility and the merits of the case, or 
try to reach an amicable settlement.141  The African Court could 
also “overrule” the African Commission and remand the case to 
the Commission for additional findings.142   
This course would provide the type of access, best described 
as “Commission-mediated direct access,” similar to that of a 
complainant in a domestic court seeking direct access to the 
highest Constitutional Court without first exhausting the usual 
domestic constitutional remedies.143  Under South African con-
stitutional law, for example, lower courts may be bypassed and 
  
 138. See generally Case 7920, Inter–Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L/V/II.68, doc. 8 
rev 1 (1986), available at http://www.cidh.org. 
 139. David J. Padilla, An African Human Rights Court: Reflections from the 
Perspective of the Inter–American System, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 185, 191 n. 22 
(2002). 
 140. See generally Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1. 
 141. Id. arts. 6(2) & 9.   
 142. See id. art. 6(3) (stating that “[t]he Court may consider cases or trans-
fer them to the Commission”).   
 143. See Rules of the Constitutional Court, Government Notice (GN) R1603 
of 31 Oct. 2003, R. 17(2) (S. Afr.) (effective Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Rules of 
the Constitutional Court], available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/rules.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2004).   
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a matter may be referred directly to the Constitutional Court if 
it is “in the interests of justice” to do so.144  
The travaux préparatoires of the Protocol suggest that an-
other consideration is the importance and urgency of the mat-
ter, such as allegations of serious or massive human rights vio-
lations.145  Frivolous and baseless complaints should not be al-
lowed direct access to the African Court.  However, Commis-
sion-mediated direct access would also eliminate the African 
Commission’s role in resolving the communication.  Therefore, 
the criteria for direct referral to the African Court depends not 
only on the urgency of the matter, but also the ramifications of 
omitting the role of the African Commission.   
For some matters, the African Commission’s role may be very 
important.  For example, it may be argued that judicial officers 
are, by their nature, training, and experience, less equipped to 
deal with on-site investigations and negotiations than are 
quasi-judicial officers.  If this is true, the African Commission 
would have an advantage in negotiating friendly settlements 
and would be better situated to conduct fact-finding, especially 
in situations where there have been massive violations that re-
quire on-site investigations.146 Therefore, the African Commis-
sion’s role should not be diminished in matters where these two 
  
 144. Id. R. 18(1)–(2).  In Bruce v. Fleecytez Johannesburg CC, the South 
African Constitutional Court held that direct access is exceptional and indi-
cated that a complainant’s prospects of success and the desirability of a court 
not to “sit as a court of first and last instance,” especially where no further 
appeal is available, played a part in its decision.  1998 (2) SALR 1143 (CC), 
paras. 7–8. In Germany, complainants in constitutional matters may ap-
proach the Bundesverfasssungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) di-
rectly, but only in exceptional circumstances, i.e., when the Court determines 
that the matter is of general importance or that serious and unavoidable dis-
advantage to the complainant would otherwise result.  Gesetz über das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Bundesverfassungsgerichts–Gesetz, BVerfGG), 
12.3.1951 (BGBl. I S.243), art. 90(2) (Federal Constitutional Court Act) 
(amended July 16, 1998), http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm.   
 145. In an earlier draft of the Protocol, which lacked the provision allowing 
states to make an optional declaration allowing individuals direct access to 
the court, the African Court was to have the discretion to allow direct access 
in “urgent cases or serious, systematic or massive violations of human rights.”  
Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, art. 6(1).   
 146. See, e.g., Frans Viljoen, Some Arguments in Favour of and Against an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 21, 43 
(A.V. Lowe et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Some Arguments in Favour]. 
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functions are at play.  Instead, these two functions would be 
best performed not by judicial institutions, such as the African 
Court, but by quasi-judicial bodies like the African Commission 
where formality is less important and ad hoc procedures are 
more common.   
In the pre-1998 European system, the European Commission 
fulfilled fact-finding functions.147  Although the European Court 
was entitled to engage in its own fact-finding,148 it did so only in 
“exceptional circumstances.”149  The European experience also 
demonstrates that friendly settlement is frequently a commis-
sion, not a court, role.150  By contrast, the Inter-American Court 
has been much more extensively involved in fact-finding.151  
Oral proceedings before the Inter-American Court form an im-
portant part of this process.152  Although the Inter-American 
Court has indicated that fact-finding is primarily the role of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, it has neverthe-
less reviewed facts de novo.153  Indeed, the Inter-American Court 
has held that it is the sole judicial body with decision-making 
power, not a court of appeal for Commission decisions.154  How-
  
 147. See Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 74 (1991) 
[hereinafter Cruz Varas Case], http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search. 
asp?skin=hudoc–en (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 148. See Kertsen Rogge, Fact–finding, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM  FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 677 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993) (dis-
cussing Rules 41 through 46 of the 1992 version of Rules of Court for the 
European Court).  
 149. See Cruz Varas Case, supra note 147, para. 74.   
 150. From 1955 to 1991, approximately twelve percent of all cases (128 
cases) before the European Commission were settled amicably; in the Euro-
pean Court, only twenty–nine friendly settlements (term includes all cases 
“dropped as a result of actions taken by those who were involved in the case”) 
were reached between 1962 and 1991.  Alexandre Kiss, Conciliation, in THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 703, 704–05 (R. St. 
J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).   
 151. See Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of 
the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a 
Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593, 629 (2000). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, para. 29 (June 26, 1987) (“The Court does not act 
as a court of review, of appeal or other similar court in its dealings with the 
Commission.  Its power to examine and review all actions and decisions of the 
Commission derives from its character as sole judicial organ in matters con-
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ever, the Inter-American Court is unlikely to use its power to 
conduct on-site investigations.155   
Domestic courts engage in both settlement and fact-finding 
activities.156  Indeed, with the exception of appellate courts, 
most domestic courts engage in fact-finding on a daily basis.157  
This demonstrates that there is nothing inherent in the judicial 
function that makes either fact-finding or dispute settlement 
inappropriate.158  To some extent, the three regional human 
rights courts all have settlement and fact-finding functions.  In 
particular, under the African system, the Protocol’s direct ac-
cess provision implies that the African Court will have to en-
gage in both fact-finding and settlement without the African 
Commission’s intervention.159  These activities are therefore in-
escapably part of the African Court’s functions.  In any event, 
the African Commission has not dealt very effectively with fact-
  
cerning the Convention.”), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf_ing/seriec_ 
01_ing.pdf. 
 155. The Inter-American Court’s competence to conduct on–site investiga-
tions is implicitly granted by its Statute.  Statute of the Inter-American Court 
on Human Rights, Oct. 31, 1979, O.A.S. Res. 448, 9th Sess., art. 3 (entered into 
force Jan 1, 1980) [hereinafter Statute of the Inter-American Court], http: 
cidh.oas.org/basicos/basic17.htm.  See also In re Viviana Gallardo, Advisory 
Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. G 101/81, para. 22 (Nov. 13, 1981) 
(advisory opinion requested by the government of Costa Rica), http:// 
www.corteidh.or.cr/seriea_ing/index.html. 
[A]lthough the Court, as any other judicial organ, does not lack the 
power to carry out its own investigations, particularly if these are 
necessary to provide the Court with the information it needs to dis-
charge its functions, the Convention entrusts to the Commission the 
initial phase of the investigation into the allegations.  The Commis-
sion also has a conciliatory function empowering it to propose friendly 
settlements as well as to make the appropriate recommendations to 
remedy the violation it has found to exist.  It is also the body to which 
the States concerned initially provide all the pertinent information 
and submissions.    
Id. 
 156. See generally Professeur Pierre Met, Introduction to the 
 English Legal System (2002), http://www.u–psud.fr/SCEAUX/enseignement/ 
R.nsf/els.htm?OpenPage (describing the function of courts in a common law 
system).  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.   
 159. See generally Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 34(6).   
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finding.160  Its findings are often factually weak; additionally, 
the African Commission has been very reluctant to second-
guess the factual findings of a domestic court.161   
Moreover, neither the Charter nor the Rules of Procedure ac-
cords the African Commission any role with regard to friendly 
settlement procedure.162  There are also very few instances 
where the African Commission has attempted to negotiate set-
tlements.  Because the African Commission lacks expertise and 
experience in this area, settlement should not be considered a 
consistent part of its practice.163  Indeed, it has no legal compe-
tence to settle cases.  The Protocol states that the African Court 
“may try to reach an amicable settlement” in cases before it “in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.”164  The relevant 
provision of the Charter, Article 48, read with Article 47 and 
supplemented by Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure, relates only 
to inter-state communications, thus restricting settlement ef-
forts for state parties involved in those disputes.165  This means 
that even the African Court has limited authority with regard 
to settlement negotiations.  However, even if this strict reading 
of the Protocol is adopted, the African Court is still likely to en-
gage in settlement negotiations, scrutinizing and formalizing 
any agreement parties reach after referral of the case.166  There-
  
 160. See Rachel Murray, Evidence and Fact–finding by the African Commis-
sion, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN 
PRACTICE, 1986–2000 100, 101–10 (Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 
2002) [hereinafter Evidence and Fact–finding].  
 161. See Bob Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt, Communication 40/90, 11th Ann. Activity 
Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at 27, para. 60 
(1997–1998) (“It does not however beho[o]ve the Commission to judge the 
facts.  This is the responsibility of the Egyptian Courts.”) [hereinafter 11th 
Ann. Activity Report]. 
 162. See OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 641. 
 163. See id. at 642–46 (analyzing the African Commission’s limited role in 
settlement).  
 164. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 9.  
 165. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 48.  
 166. See Vincent Berger, Le règlement amiable devant la Cour europeénne 
des Droits de l’Homme, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN 
DIMENSION: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF GÉRARD J. WIARDA  55–56 (1988) (discuss-
ing instances in which the European Court has handed down judgments for-
malising friendly settlements or agreements between parties).  The Inter-
American Court plays a relatively passive role in friendly settlement.  See 
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 54 
(2000) (amended Dec. 2003) (providing that the Court may strike cases from 
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fore, “in accordance with the provisions of the Charter” could be 
interpreted to refer to the content of the agreement between the 
parties.  Thus, as long as a case is before it, the African Court 
may try to reach a friendly settlement, but must ensure that 
the settlement is human rights friendly and comports with the 
Charter.167   
It thus follows that many cases may be directly submitted to 
the African Court without undermining the African Commis-
sion’s role. In this scenario, the exhaustion of local remedies 
would also be relevant to the African Commission’s decision.168   
Commission-mediated direct access arguably amounts to a de 
facto “declaration in terms of article 34(6)”169 for states that had 
not made any de jure declaration, giving rise to a situation 
where individuals could submit complaints to the African Court 
against states not accepting direct submissions, thus sidestep-
ping the clear requirements of the Protocol.170  A response to 
this argument, however, is that a declaration under Article 
34(6) is made explicitly, for all cases, and that Commission-
mediated direct access is exceptional and relates to the exigen-
cies of a particular case without implying general acceptance.  
Moreover, Article 5 allows the African Commission to submit 
cases to the African Court without stipulating to either the ad-
  
its list when “parties to a case before the Court” inform it of the existence of a 
friendly settlement) [hereinafter Inter-American Court Rules of Procedure], 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/general_ing/rules.html; Rules of Procedure of the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, art. 41(1) (2000) (amended 
Dec. 2003) (requiring the Commission to put itself “at the disposal of the par-
ties concerned”) [hereinafter Inter-American Commission Rules of Procedure], 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic16.htm. 
 167. See Kiss, supra note 150, at 705 (procedure for friendly settlement in 
European system “based upon Rule 49 of the present Rules of the [European] 
Court”). 
 168. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 56(5) (requiring the exhaustion 
of local remedies).  
 169. See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 3.  
 170. The Protocol does not explicitly provide that all cases must be decided 
by the African Commission before their submission to the Court.  However, if 
the Commission submits all cases directly to the Court under art. 5(1) without 
making any findings, the optional declaration mechanism under art. 34(6) 
would be rendered unnecessary.  Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 
1, arts. 5(1), 34(6).   
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missibility or the merits of the case.171  In any event, the African 
Court is competent to deal with both admissibility and merit.172  
Allowing for Commission-mediated direct access is the method 
best suited to give effect to the Preamble to the Protocol, (which 
links the African Court to the “achievement of the legitimate 
aspirations of the African peoples”)173 and does not detract from 
the Court’s main purpose of complementing and reinforcing the 
African Commission.174  Adopting this course would also reduce 
duplication and delays, important goals in a resource-
constrained environment, and would guarantee greater “equal-
ity of arms” between the state and individual.175  Still, this 
should be seen as an exceptional way of reaching the African 
Court, not the rule. 
Scenario 2:  The African Commission could adopt a more fluid 
approach and submit a case to the African Court after partial 
review.  This would require the African Commission to conduct 
admissibility findings.176  If such a course is adopted, the African 
system should emulate the European system; that is, the Afri-
can Commission should not refer cases it has found to be inad-
missible.177   
  
 171. Id. art. 5 (silent as to any requirements African Commission must fulfil 
before submitting cases to the Court).   
 172. Id. art. 3.   
 173. Id. pmbl.   
 174. See id. 
 175. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 9 to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, ETS No. 140, para. 13 (opened for signature Nov. 6, 1990) (repealed by 
Protocol No. 11 on Nov. 1, 1998) (arguing that change in European Convention 
is warranted because states and non–state applicants lacked equal access to 
the European Court), http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html/140. 
htm. 
 176. The African Court can still conduct admissibility findings.  In fact, the 
grounds upon which the Court may base its admissibility findings are broader 
than the African Commission’s; unlike the Commission, the Court is not com-
pelled to “base” its findings on the grounds established in art. 56 of the Char-
ter, but need only take them into account.  See Protocol to the African Char-
ter, supra note 1, art. 6(2). 
 177. H.C. Krüger & C.A. Nørgaard, The Right of Application, in THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 657, 674–75 (R. St. 
J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993) (describing how the European system works). 
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The African Commission could also conduct fact-finding and, 
if applicable, settlement negotiations.178  The African Commis-
sion’s role would be expanded from that described in scenario 
one; the African Commission would have the additional author-
ity to refer matters to the African Court after making findings 
of fact, but before considering the merits.  Proceedings before 
the African Court would then deal primarily with legal, rather 
than factual, questions.  The Protocol does not exclude this pos-
sibility.179  While such an approach would necessitate improve-
ment of the African Commission’s fact-finding techniques, it 
could also be advantageous.  It could lead to a more efficient 
division of labor, fewer delays, and a better use of resources 
since witnesses would only testify once and only one set of ar-
guments and pleadings would be required.180  In my opinion, 
such practical concerns will determine the viability of the co-
existence of the Court and the Commission.  This proposal thus 
differs from both the Inter-American and pre-Protocol No. 11 
European systems by suggesting a solution appropriate to the 
African context. 
To some extent, this scenario mirrors the Inter-American sys-
tem, where the Inter-American Commission may refer a matter 
to the Inter-American Court after failing to reach a friendly set-
tlement.181  In an advisory opinion resulting from a refusal by 
  
 178. See generally Murray, Evidence and Fact–finding, supra note 160.  See 
also OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 641–46.  
 179. The African Court’s main role is to determine if there has been a viola-
tion of the African Charter.  See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, 
art. 27(1) (this provision, entitled “findings,” permits the Court to make orders 
to remedy human rights violations).  It appears that the Court’s proceedings 
need not include factual inquiries, and could instead be restricted to questions 
of law.  See id. art. 10.  This possibility is supported by the language in art. 
26, which states that the Court “shall hear submissions by all parties” and 
hold enquiries only “if deemed necessary.”  Id. art 26(1). 
 180. See Murray, Comparison Between African and European Courts, supra 
note 5, at 198–99 (noting that in the pre–Protocol No. 11 European system, 
there was a presumption that the European Commission was primarily re-
sponsible for fact–finding).  Murray argues that “a delegation of responsibility 
between a Commission that deals with disputes of facts and a Court which 
looks at cases of disputes of law … might be useful for the African system.”  
Id.  
 181. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 51, 9 
I.L.M. 673, 689.  (When a settlement is not reached in the Inter–American 
system, art. 51 allows the Inter–American Commission to “set forth its opin-
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the Inter-American Commission to refer a contentious case to 
the Court, the Inter-American Court held that the Convention 
does not require “that the Commission determine that the Con-
vention has been violated before the case may be referred by it 
to the Court.”182  According to the Inter-American Court, factors 
such as the controversial nature of the issue, the novelty of the 
issue, and the general importance of the issue to the hemisphere 
at large may play a role in a decision to refer.183  To be clear, this 
scenario proposes that the African Commission submit to the 
African Court in as many cases as possible.  Urgency need not 
be a criterion, thus making submission the rule rather than the 
exception.   
Scenario 3:  Under the third scenario, the African Commis-
sion would finalize communications before submitting them to 
the African Court.  The Protocol “appear[s] to suggest” that the 
Commission will only refer cases after considering them, “thus 
following the approach of the previous European organs”184 and 
that of the Inter-American organs.  Under the Inter-American 
system, the state is given a fixed term within which it must 
comply with the remedy.185  After the term’s expiration, the In-
ter-American Commission decides whether adequate measures 
were taken.186  If the Inter-American Commission finds a failure 
of state compliance, referral to the Inter-American Court is a 
rebuttable presumption; the Inter-American Commission “shall 
refer the case to the Court” unless it decides otherwise.187  When 
the state prevails, the Inter-American Commission has a “spe-
  
ion and conclusions” and then vote on whether that report should be pub-
lished.  Implicit in this is that the Inter–American Commission, as part of its 
art. 51 obligations, can submit the matter to the Inter–American Court.) 
[hereinafter American Convention].   
 182. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the 
Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29, American Convention on Human 
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC–5/85, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, para. 
24 (1985) [hereinafter Compulsory Membership Case].   
 183. Id. para. 25. 
 184. Murray, Comparison Between the African and European Courts, supra 
note 5, at 198 (arguing that based on art. 8 of the Protocol, the rules of the 
Court should be adopted “bearing in mind the complementarity between the 
Commission and the Court”).    
 185. American Convention, supra note 181, art. 51(2).  
 186. Id. art. 51(3).   
 187. Inter–American Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art. 
44. 
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cial duty to consider the advisability of coming to the Court,” 
especially since the individual has no standing to take the mat-
ter further.188   
Initially, the European system did not allow individuals to 
submit cases to the Court.189 However, Protocol No. 9 to the 
European Convention changed this policy and provided that 
“the person, non-governmental organisation or group of persons 
having lodged the complaint with the Commission” could also 
refer cases to the European Court in their own name and with-
out the mediating presence of the European Commission.190  
This referral was only provisional; a three-judge panel, includ-
ing the judge from the state complained against, had to give its 
approval.191  The panel was to consider whether the matter 
raised a serious question of interpretation or application, but 
could also reject referral “for any other reason.”192 
Thus far, the African Commission has decided in favor of in-
dividuals in most cases.193  Should the African Commission 
submit these cases to the African Court?  Although there is an 
argument that all such cases should be referred to ensure that 
the recommendatory findings of the Commission are converted 
into legally binding decisions,194 the state should be allowed an 
opportunity to comply with the African Commission’s finding 
  
 188. Compulsory Membership Case, supra note 182, para. 26.     
 189. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 25. 
 190. Protocol No. 9 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 6, 1990, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. 693, 694 
(entered into force Oct. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Protocol No. 9].   
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. In the first eleven years of its existence, the African Commission made 
final decisions on the merits in seventeen cases.  Fifteen violations were 
found, and the Commission only found in favor of the state in two cases.   See 
Viljoen, Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System, supra note 5, 
at 170–74.  The Commission’s tendency to find in favor of individuals has 
continued (at least through the end of 2001).  See Viljoen, Introduction to the 
African Commission, supra note 91, at 446–53.  
 194. In the pre-1998 European system, all admissible cases ended in final 
decisions, either by their submission to the European Court, or in binding 
decisions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.  See Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 17, art. 32.  In the African system, the AU Ex-
ecutive Council is empowered to monitor the African Court’s judgements, but 
not the African Commission’s findings.  These findings remain “recommenda-
tions” unless the AU Assembly confers legal status on them by “adopting” 
them.  See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 9–10.  
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before the matter is referred to the African Court if compliance 
is the primary goal.  This procedure would reflect the practice of 
the Inter-American Commission whereby, in the absence of 
compliance, the Inter-American Commission refers cases auto-
matically to the Inter-American Court, unless there is a “rea-
soned decision” to the contrary.195  However, this could lead to 
further delays, would require improvement of the African 
Commission’s monitoring and follow-up procedure, and may be 
manipulated by states.   
On the other hand, states are unlikely to subject cases de-
cided against individuals to further scrutiny.  The African 
Commission should, therefore, refer all cases decided against 
individuals to the African Court, unless some exceptional cir-
cumstance, such as manifest lack of substance, is present.  If 
the African Commission adopted a standard requiring a “likeli-
hood of success” for such referrals, the process could become too 
burdensome and lead to subjectivity in its findings.  However, 
the African Commission could decide that resources and time 
should be prioritized for cases with a “good chance of winning”196 
so as not to harm the public perception of the African Court and 
trigger the development of a negative jurisprudence.   
3. State Party Citizen – Victim: Article 5(1)(d) 
A state may also submit a case to the African Court when one 
of its citizens “is a victim of human rights violation.”197  Because 
the Protocol does not also state that the citizen should have 
“lodged a complaint” with the African Commission as the other 
two sub-articles dealing with state submission do,198 the word 
“is” implies that there is some “objective truth.”   
One interpretation is that this “objective truth” is equivalent 
to the state’s viewpoint.  Therefore, this provision opens the 
door for states to submit cases directly to the African Court if 
the rights of its citizens are, in its opinion, violated by another 
state.  Thus, some inter-state complaints, namely those which 
involve citizens, would be privileged, and the inter-state com-
  
 195. Inter–American Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art. 
43(2). 
 196. Padilla, supra note 139, at 191.   
 197. Protocol of the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(d).   
 198. Id. art. 5(1)(b)–(c). 
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plaints system provided for under the Charter would be over-
ridden.   
Another interpretation that fits better with the term “is a vic-
tim” is that the African Commission must have made a finding 
that the individual is, indeed, a victim.  This is not satisfactory, 
as it would allow states to submit cases to the African Court 
only when the Commission has found a violation.  If this inter-
pretation is adopted,  states must be willing to refer matters on 
behalf of their citizens, otherwise the African Court will not 
have jurisdiction.     
It is possible that the drafters’ intention was only to emulate 
the pre-Protocol No. 11 European Convention, which allowed a 
state “whose national is alleged to be a victim” to refer a case to 
the European Court.199  Soering v. U.K presents a typical illus-
tration of this provision’s application: the applicant, a German 
national, lodged a complaint against the United Kingdom, 
where he was residing at the time of the complaint. 200  After the 
European Commission’s final report had been adopted and 
transferred to the Committee of Ministers, the Commission, 
respondent United Kingdom, and the German government suc-
cessively referred the case to the European Court.201  
  
 199. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 48.  
 200. See generally Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989). 
 201. It was referred by the European Commission on Jan. 25, 1989; the 
United Kingdom on Jan. 30, 1989; and Germany on Feb. 3, 1989.  See LUKE 
CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE CONVENTION 
74 (1994). See also Bob Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt, Communication 40/90, 11th Ann. 
Activity Report, supra note 161, at 27 (illustrating the potential usefulness of 
a provision allowing a state, whose citizen is an alleged victim, to refer a case 
to the African Court).  A Nigerian national who was arrested while in the 
“transit zone” of Cairo Airport, and who was charged, convicted, and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment on a drug–related offence in Egypt, directed a 
complaint to the Commission.  Reluctant to interfere with the factual findings 
of the Egyptian courts, the Commission concluded that there was no violation 
of the African Charter.  Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the 
Commission or Egypt would have submitted the case to the Court, but Nigeria 
might have, had art. 5(1)(d) of the Protocol been in place at the time.  See id. 
para. 60.  
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4. African Intergovernmental Organizations—Article 5(1)(e) 
African intergovernmental organizations may also submit 
cases to the African Court.202  One such institution is the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(African Children’s Committee),203 the implementing body of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child 
(African Children’s Charter).  After finalizing a case, the Afri-
can Children’s Committee has the same competence as the Afri-
can Commission to refer cases to the African Court.204  It is pos-
sible that other intergovernmental organizations, such as re-
gional economic arrangements, or even the AU itself, could 
submit cases directly to the African Court under Article 
5(1)(e).205  Arguably, this provision enables the AU to submit a 
case against any AU member state so long as that state 
breached the AU Charter or any other human rights treaty rati-
fied by that state.206  Therefore, depending on the disputed sub-
ject matter, the AU may access either of the two courts to be 
established under its auspices: the African Human Rights Court 
for human rights violations or the African Court of Justice for 
matters related to economic integration and politics.207   
  
 202. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(e). 
 203. See generally Amanda Lloyd, The First Meeting of the African Commit-
tee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 320 
(2002) (discussing the first meeting of the African Children’s Committee in 
2002). 
 204. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(e). 
 205. See id.   
 206. See id.   
 207. This implies a judicial duality similar to that between the Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg institutions in Europe.  The AU Assembly adopted the Pro-
tocol of the Court of Justice on July 11, 2003.  Protocol of the Court of Justice 
of the African Union, June 11, 2003 (by July 31, 2004, four states had ratified 
the Protocol, which requires 15 deposited ratifications entry into force) [here-
inafter Protocol of the Court of Justice], http://www.africa–union.org 
/home/welcome.htm.  See generally Chris M. Peter, The Proposed African 
Court of Justice–Jurisprudential, Procedural, Enforcement Problems and Be-
yond, 1 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 117 (1993) (for an early discussion of the 
African Court of Justice).  See also Nsongurua J. Udombana, An African Hu-
man Rights Court and an African Union Court: A Needful Duality or a Need-
less Duplication?, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 811 (2003) (discussing the duality of 
the two African courts).  
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5. Direct Access – Article 5(3) 
State consent, taking the form of a declaration under Article 
34(6), is a prerequisite for direct access to the African Court.208  
Although only one of the ratifying states has made an Article 
34(6) declaration, the situation is not hopeless; state parties 
may make such declarations “at any time” subsequent to ratifi-
cation.209  
The standing of individuals under the African Commission’s 
Charter has been quite broad.  The Charter does not have the 
victim requirement found in other conventions (such as the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or 
the European Convention),210 and allows individuals, groups or 
NGOs to lodge communications.211  Cases that reach the African 
Court after going through the African Commission must also 
fulfill these requirements.212  However, the Protocol does not 
  
 208. Art. 34(6) provides:  “At the time of ratification … or any time thereaf-
ter, the State shall make a declaration.”  Protocol to the African Charter, su-
pra note 1, art. 34(6).  Plain language advocates take issue with the word 
“shall,” arguing that it is often unclear whether “shall” is used to denote a 
future action or compulsion.  The use of “shall” in the Protocol cannot express 
compulsion, however, as the declaration is optional.  To some extent it refers 
to the future, but, in essence, “shall” seems to express a discretionary compe-
tence.   
 209. Id.  It has been suggested that this provision allows ad hoc declarations 
for the purpose of a particular case, or for a fixed period.  It is difficult to con-
ceive of a situation in which a state would make a case–specific declaration:  
direct submission of cases depends on the initiative of the individual, who can 
only commence an action if the state had already made the declaration.  For a 
state to make a case–specific declaration, it would need to foresee that an 
individual intended to bring such a case.  Period–specific declarations should 
be discouraged, as they invite regression and uncertainty. 
 210. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm. Decision, J.H. v. Canada, Communica-
tion 187/85, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 230, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 
(1985) (declaring the communication inadmissible due to a lack of any indica-
tion that “the author [had] himself been adversely affected”), available at 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/humanrts/undocs/session40/187–1985.htm 
(last visited on Aug. 22, 2004); Kertsen Rogge, Examining the Merits of Hu-
man Rights Applications—The Legal Issues, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: 
THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1215, 1217 (Paul Mahoney et al., eds., 2000) (not-
ing that art. 34 of the European Convention states that “the individual appli-
cant must be a ‘victim’ of the alleged violation”). 
 211. See American Convention, supra note 181, art. 44 (broad provision 
permitting “any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity” to 
lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission).   
 212. See OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 732.   
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contain any language regarding cases brought directly to the 
African Court.  Accordingly, it should not be construed as re-
strictive of victims’ access to the African Court.      
Direct access is restricted to NGOs “with observer status be-
fore the Commission.”213  The African Commission has granted 
observer status to over 400 NGOs, both African and interna-
tional.214  Although most cases submitted to the African Com-
mission have been submitted by NGOs enjoying observer 
status,215 cases can also be brought in the name of an individual 
when the NGO does not have observer status.216   
Article 5(3) provides that the African Court “may entitle” in-
dividuals to submit cases directly before it so long as the state 
party has made an Article 34(6) declaration.217  This phrase 
should not be read to give the African Court additional discre-
tion to refuse hearing a case.  Granting the African Court a dis-
cretionary power of refusal would be unduly burdensome on 
individuals because they would be required to jump two proce-
dural hurdles:  the state’s acceptance of the optional Article 
34(6) mechanism and the African Court’s discretionary ap-
proval.  This discretionary language is rooted in the drafting 
history of the Protocol and was introduced when direct access 
was at the African Court’s discretion.218  However, since direct 
  
 213. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(3).   
 214. See African Commission, Directory of NGOs with Observer Status, 
www.achpr.org/english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html (last visited Aug. 31, 
2004).   
 215. NGOs enjoying observer status that have submitted communications in 
their own name include Amnesty International, Civil Liberties Organisation 
(Nigeria), Constitutional Rights Project (Nigeria), International Pen and the 
Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme.  NGOs without observer status, 
including Centre for Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the Comité Cul-
turel pour la Démocratie au Bénin and the Malawi African Association, have 
also submitted communications.  See id; OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, app. 7, at 
907–17. 
 216. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(3).  
 217. Id.   
 218. See Draft Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, ICJ Draft Additional Protocol, AU Res. 230 (XXX), art. 20(1) 
(Jan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter ICJ Draft Additional Protocol], http://www. 
chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING
%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%20OF%20THE%20AFRICA
N%20COURT%20p.170.doc; Cape Town Draft Protocol, supra note 47, art. 
6(1); Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, art. 6(1). 
File: Viljoen Macro 122704.doc Created on:  12/27/2004 3:47 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:48 PM 
40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:1 
access became subject to an optional state declaration, the 
drafters’ failure to remove the language appears to be a mere 
oversight.  Therefore, the provision should be interpreted to 
place authorization for direct access “within the sole domain” of 
state parties.219 
The Protocol also restricts the competence of groups to bring 
cases. 220  This seems counterintuitive, in the light of the peoples’ 
concept inherent in the Charter.  If the rights of individuals and 
peoples are the golden threads running through the Charter, 
the standing requirements must reflect that.  As this is ex-
cluded, this aspect should be clarified in the Rules of the Court.   
B. Role of Individuals Before the Court 
The African Commission’s Rules of Procedure require that re-
spondent states and complainants submit written information 
and observations on the admissibility and merits of the case,221 
which allows the African Commission to consider the complain-
ants’ arguments when making decisions.222  Additionally, de-
spite the lack of any substantive provision within the Charter, 
the African Commission generally allows individuals or NGOs 
to be present at hearings or be represented during its consid-
eration of communications lodged by those individuals or 
NGOs.223  However, no provision has been made for legal aid or 
for the awarding of costs in either the Charter or the Commis-
sion’s Rules of Procedure.   
Individuals who bring a case directly before the African Court 
are entitled, as a “party to a case,” to be represented by a legal 
representative of their choice.224  But what about individuals 
who have lodged communications with the African Commission 
and whose cases are then submitted to the African Court, either 
by the Commission or the state?  Under these circumstances, 
the individual remains “a party” to the case; the African Com-
  
 219. OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 724.    
 220. Id. at 714–24 (discussing the jurisdiction of the African Court). 
 221. Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, R. 119 (stating the Commission’s 
procedures for consideration of a communication). 
 222. Murray, Evidence and Fact-finding, supra note 160, at 102–03 (noting 
that the Commission has relied primarily on written documents in making 
decisions).  
 223. Id. at 104–06. 
 224. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(2).   
File: Viljoen Macro 122704.doc Created on: 12/27/2004 3:47 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:48 PM 
2004] HUMAN RIGHTS COURT 41 
mission does not become a party to the case merely by submit-
ting the case to the African Court, but, instead, initiates pro-
ceedings between the given parties before the Court.  In the 
dual European system, the European Commission’s function 
was primarily to clarify and justify its own opinion and to en-
sure that all relevant information was placed before the Euro-
pean Court.225  The contention that the individual remains a 
party seems logical in light of the fact that state parties may 
refer cases to the African Court.  It would be anomalous to ac-
cept that the individual loses its status as a party; it would 
mean that only states may be parties.  It follows that individu-
als, as parties to the case, are also “entitled to be represented by 
a legal representative” of their choice when cases involving 
them are submitted to the African Court by either a state or the 
African Commission.226  
This interpretation corresponds with developments under the 
two other major human rights systems.  Initially, neither the 
European nor the Inter-American systems allowed individuals 
to be present, nor be represented, or make representations to 
their courts.227  Gradually, though, the individual’s role grew 
and both systems allowed individuals the right to be present 
and represented.  Thus, individuals could make submissions 
directly to the courts in both systems.228  In all but name, indi-
viduals were parties to the case.   
Originally, the European Convention did not create a role for 
complainants in the process before the European Court.229  
Gradually, however, the European Commission, on a discre-
tionary basis, allowed individual complainants to be present as 
assistants to its lawyers.230  In its very first case, the European 
  
 225. See CLEMENTS, supra note 201, at 75. 
 226. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(2). 
 227. See American Convention, supra note 181, art. 57; Statute of the Inter–
American Court, supra note 155, art. 28. 
 228. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 20–21.  
 229. Under Rule 1 of the original Rules of the European Court, the com-
plainant was not regarded as a “party” to the proceedings before the Court.  
See CLEMENTS, supra note 201, at 75 (noting that the applicant’s status is 
much improved under the current Rules).   
 230. Rule 33(3)(d) in the 1992 Rules of the European Court required the 
European Court to ask applicants if they wished to participate in the proceed-
ings, and, if so, to provide the particulars of their legal representatives.  Un-
der Rule 30(1) (also part of the 1992 Rules), applicants could be represented 
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Court held that it should be informed of the applicant’s views.231  
In a decision ten years later, the European Court held that the 
applicant’s lawyer could act as assistant to the European Com-
mission’s delegates, but would “always [be] subject to the con-
trol and responsibility of the Delegates.”232  When the amended 
Rules of Court became effective in 1983, the European Commis-
sion became legally obligated to inform applicants of their 
rights and invite them to be represented at hearings.233  
In the Inter-American system, a similar pragmatic approach 
was adopted.  The complainant’s lawyer was allowed to be part 
of the Inter-American Commission’s legal team, and could “pre-
sent the petitioner’s argument in that capacity, though only 
under the control of the Commission.”234  However, serving as an 
“assistant” on the Inter-American Commission’s team was not 
ideal, as the interests and approach of the Inter-American 
Commission “as guardian of the Convention assisting the 
Court” and those of the complainant did not always coincide.235  
Consequently, the Rules of Court for the Inter-American Court 
were amended in 1996 to allow the victims’ representatives to 
  
by appropriately qualified legal practitioners.  See CLEMENTS, supra note 201, 
at 75.   
 231. Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1960).  Neither the 
applicant nor his representative appeared—the Commission’s delegate pre-
sented these views as part of his oral submission at the Court’s hearing.  See 
Paul Mahoney, Developments in the Procedure of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights: The Revised Rules of Court, in 3 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 
127, 129–30 (F. G. Jacobs ed., 1983).    
 232. De Wilde, Ooms, & Versyp v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 
(1970).  
 233. Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, R. 30(1) & 33(3)(d) (en-
tered into force Apr. 20, 1992) (pre–Protocol No. 11) [hereinafter 1992 Rules of 
European Court], reprinted in CLEMENTS, supra note 201, at 271–74. 
 234. David J. Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter–
American Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 
25 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998) (stating that the Com-
mission may “hide a petitioner’s lawyer under its skirts”).  Padilla, supra note 
139, at 192 (By designating victims or NGOs as “legal advisors,” the Inter–
American Court essentially “permits the victim a place at the table alongside” 
the Commission and “allows the victim to actively participate in the litigation 
of the case.”). 
 235. Antônio Augusto Cançado Trinidade, The Inter-American Human 
Rights System at the Dawn of the New Century: Recommendations for Im-
provement of its Mechanisms of Protection, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 395, 415 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).  
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present autonomous arguments “at the stage of reparations.”236  
The 1996 amendments created a strange situation: a complain-
ant could lodge a case before the Inter-American Commission, 
that is, be in complete control at the beginning of the case and 
could make presentations at the reparations phase before the 
Inter-American Court at the end of the case, but did not have 
autonomous standing during the proceedings.237  Subsequent 
amendments to the Rules in 2001, however, provided for com-
plainant participation in all stages of the proceeding before the 
Inter-American Court.238 
The importance of the presence and participation of the indi-
vidual, perhaps, boils down to the function of, and faith in, the 
African Commission.  Sir Humphrey Waldock has suggested 
that the role of the African Commission in litigation before the 
African Court is “not litigious: it is ministerial.”239  The African 
Commission’s responsibility is to place the relevant elements of 
the case before the African Court, not to defend the individual’s 
case.  This role should be juxtaposed with that of individuals 
and their representatives.  Rejecting an early challenge to an 
individual’s presence at a hearing, the European Court said 
that the European Commission, in its role as “defender of the 
public interest,” must “make known the Applicant’s views to the 
Court as a means of throwing light on the points at issue … 
even if it does not share them.”240  Because “the whole of the 
proceedings before the Court are upon issues which concern the 
Applicant,” the Court held that it is “in the interests of the 
proper administration of justice that the Court should have 
knowledge” of the individual’s contentions.241  Therefore, in or-
der to ensure a “genuine hearing of both sides in contention,”242 
the African Court should interpret the Protocol to allow indi-
  
 236. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 20 (explaining that in the Inter–
American system, under the 1996 Rules of the Court, art. 23, victims were 
allowed representation at the reparations stage of proceedings).   
 237. See Trinidade, supra note 235, at 416. 
 238. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 20 (Inter-American Court amended 
the definition of “parties to the case” to include the “victim or the alleged vic-
tim, the State, and, only procedurally, the Commission”). 
 239. See MARK W. JANIS, ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67 (1995) 
(viewpoint of Sir Humphrey Waldock). 
 240. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16. 
 241. Id. at 15.  
 242. Mahoney, supra note 231, at 131.   
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viduals to be represented in all hearings before it.  The role of 
the African Commission, then, more clearly becomes that of 
guardian of the public interest.   
IV. THE  BROADER LEGAL CONTEXT 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Contentious Cases 
Article 3 provides that the African Court’s jurisdiction ex-
tends to the Charter, the Protocol and “other relevant human 
rights instruments ratified by the states concerned.”243  While 
the first two legal bases (the Charter and the Protocol) are not 
surprising, the third certainly is.  At first glance, this provision 
seems to enlarge the subject matter of the African Court in con-
tentious cases to include all other human rights instruments.244  
The use of qualifiers such as “relevant,” “ratified,” “human 
rights” and “by the state concerned,” however, may actually 
serve to limit the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.245   
The most important qualifier is “ratified,” which implies that 
the instruments referred to must be treaties, not merely decla-
rations or other non-binding legal texts or instruments.  African 
human rights treaties, such as the 1969 OAU Convention Gov-
erning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU 
Refugee Convention),246 the 1990 African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Committee)247 and 
the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, should be considered first.248  Indeed, the 
Nouakchott Draft Protocol restricted the term “other treaties” 
to exactly this group by including the word “African” before 
  
 243. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 3(1). 
 244. The Protocol does not restrict the term “other relevant human rights 
instruments” in art. 3 to certain geographical regions or to certain institu-
tional frameworks (e.g., the OAU/ AU).  See id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, CAB/LEG/24.3 (entered into force June 20, 1974), 
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1997, supra note 25, at 34 [hereinafter OAU 
Refugee Convention].   
 247. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 1990, 
CAB/LEG/153/Rev 2 [hereinafter African Children’s Committee], reprinted in 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1997, supra note 25, at 38.  
 248. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 29(1).   
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“human rights instrument.”249  The OAU/AU’s inclusion in the 
African Court’s jurisdictional scope seems logical considering 
the problematic dispute resolution mechanisms inherent in 
many of these treaties.  For example, the OAU Refugee Conven-
tion’s lack of a dispute settlement mechanism has always been 
one of its weaknesses.250  Moreover, because the African Chil-
dren’s Committee’s mandate is so similar to that of the African 
Commission,251 and suffers from the same institutional and 
functional weaknesses, it seems only logical to supplement and 
reinforce its protective mandate by introducing the African 
Court as a judicial body with competence over its provisions.  
African human rights instruments such as the 1976 Algiers 
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples,252 the Kampala 
Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa,253 and the numerous 
resolutions of the African Commission are excluded from serv-
ing as a basis for a contentious case because of their non-
binding nature. 
Reliance is further restricted to “human rights” treaties.  
Some treaties adopted under OAU auspices have a significant 
bearing on human rights, but are not human rights instru-
ments in the narrow sense of that phrase. In one of its advisory 
opinions, the Inter-American Court distinguished “modern hu-
man rights treaties,” the objectives of which are “the protection 
of the basic rights of individual beings irrespective of their na-
tionality,” from “multilateral treaties of the traditional type” 
that are “concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of 
  
 249. Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, at 259, art. 3(1). 
 250. See generally George Okoth-Obbo, Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of 
the 1996 OAU Refugee Convention, 8 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 3 (2000) (discussing the 
OAU Refugee Convention); Robin Ramcharan, The African Refugee Crisis, 8 
AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 119 (2000) (arguing that refugee rights offenses should be 
re–conceptualized as human rights violations and that the African human 
rights machinery should be improved to deal with such cases).   
 251. Like the African Commission, the African Children’s Committee has a 
broad promotional mandate, including the competence to examine state re-
ports, and to consider inter–state and individual communications.  African 
Children’s Committee, supra note 247, at 45–46, arts. 42, 43 & 44. 
 252. Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, Algiers, July 4, 1976, 
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 782.  
 253. Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, Res. 36, U.N. 
ESCOR, 36th mtg., annex (1997), http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res 
/1997/eres1997-36.htm, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 822.    
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rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting State.”254  The 
main dividing line is that states assume obligations “towards all 
individuals within their jurisdiction” when they ratify human 
rights treaties, and not merely “in relation to other States.”255  
Thus, AU treaties such as the 1968 African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources256 and the 1977 
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa257 are 
not included in the African Court’s jurisdiction under Article 3.  
Although these treaties place obligations upon states that have 
important human rights implications, they do not provide for 
human rights in the sense of direct entitlements or subjective 
rights available to individuals.258  Likewise, the AU Constitutive 
Act, the treaty establishing the African Economic Community 
(AEC Treaty) and regional economic treaties such as the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States Treaty (ECOWAS 
Treaty) do not qualify as “human rights” treaties, despite mak-
ing adherence to the African Charter part of their aims and ob-
jectives.259  The principal goal of these treaties is economic and 
  
 254. Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC–2/82, Inter-Am 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 2, para. 29 (Sept. 24, 1982), http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/iachr/b_11_4b.htm. 
 255. Id.  
 256. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources, Sept. 15, 1968, CAB/LEG/24.1 [hereinafter Convention on Nature], 
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 116.  
 257. OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, July 3, 
1977, CM/187 (XXIX) Annex II Rev. 1, http://www.africa-union.org/ 
home/welcome.htm, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 116. 
 258. Although the purpose of the Convention on Nature is to ensure the 
conservation of natural resources such as soil and water, individuals do not 
have standing under the Convention to “enforce” these policies.  Convention 
on Nature, supra note 256, arts. 4, 5. 
 259. See generally Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for Better Pro-
tection of Human Rights in Africa? 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J 299 (2001) (discussing 
the AU); Frans Viljoen, The Realization of Human Rights in Africa through 
Sub–Regional Institutions, 7 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 185 (1999).  See also Treaty 
Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3, 1991, art. 3(g), 30 
I.L.M. 1241, 1253 (on economic groupings) [hereinafter Treaty Establishing 
AEC]; Treaty Establishing Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 
Nov. 5, 1993, art. 6(e), 33 I.L.M.1067, 1076 [hereinafter Treaty Establishing 
Common Market]; Economic Community of West African States: Revised 
Treaty, July 24, 1993, art. 4(g), 35 I.L.M. 660, 668 [hereinafter Economic 
Community of West African States].  
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political integration.260  Although all of these organizations con-
sider human rights in the formulation and application of their 
policies,261 this fact alone cannot transform them into human 
rights organizations or their founding treaties into human 
rights instruments.  This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that judicial institutions have already been or are being estab-
lished to settle disputes arising from these treaties.262   
Because African states do not qualify as state parties to other 
regional human rights treaties,263 the omission of “African” im-
plies that the Court can adjudicate matters arising under UN 
human rights treaties to which AU members, who are also UN 
members, are parties.  The phrase “by the States concerned” 
implies that an individual communication may be directed to 
the African Court on the basis of a UN human rights treaty if 
the respondent state has ratified it.264   The problems arising 
from this expansion in jurisdictional scope are legion.  For ex-
ample, it would mean that a communication under the ICCPR 
could be submitted to either the HRC or the African Court.  
This may lead to divergence in jurisprudence and to forum-
shopping where quasi-judicial and judicial institutions are com-
pared and played off against one another.265  As Österdahl notes, 
it “may be a delicate matter for the African Court to apply an 
international convention to which non-African states are also 
parties, and to render judgments on how the Convention should 
  
 260. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing AEC, supra note 259, at 1253, art. 3(g); 
Treaty Establishing Common Market, supra note 259, at 1067, art. 6(e); Eco-
nomic Community of West African States, supra note 259, at 668, art. 4(g). 
 261. See Treaty Establishing AEC, supra note 259, at 1253, arts. 4(1)(a), 6; 
Economic Community of West African States, supra note 259, at 668, arts. 
3(1), 3(2)a–o. 
 262. For example, the AU Assembly adopted the Protocol to the African 
Charter, thus creating the African Court.  See Protocol to the African Charter, 
supra note 1.  
 263. Membership in the Council of Europe or the Organization of American 
States (OAS) is a prerequisite for becoming a state party to either the Euro-
pean Convention or American Convention.  European Convention, supra note 
17, art. 66(1); American Convention, supra note 181, art. 74(1). 
 264. See Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: In 
Need of Reform?, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 155, 166–67 (2001) (noting that this 
interpretation might inhibit states from ratifying the Protocol and UN treaties 
as a result).  
 265. See Charney, supra note 45, at 699, 706.   
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be interpreted on a particular point.”266  Even more strikingly, a 
state that had not accepted the optional individual complaints 
procedures under Article 34(6) may find that the African Court 
usurps jurisdiction against it under Article 3.267  Additionally, 
this interpretation would allow individuals to submit cases on 
the basis of UN treaties, such as the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which ordinarily prohibit the sub-
mission of individual communications.268  A solution is to inter-
pret “States concerned” as all state parties to the Protocol, not 
only the state against which the complaint is brought.  Such a 
reading would at least restrict the African Court’s jurisdiction 
in contentious cases to UN treaties ratified by all state parties 
to the Protocol.269   
But the problems raised may remain illusory, at least for the 
time being.  Nineteen states have ratified the Charter so far 
and only one has made an Article 34(6) declaration.270  Because 
direct access to the Court by individuals is restricted to states 
  
 266. Inger Österdahl, The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African 
Court of Human and People’s Rights: A Comparative Critique, 7 REV. AFR. 
COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES RTS. 132 (1998).   
 267. For example, Lesotho is a state party to the African Charter and the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).  It has ratified the Protocol, but has not 
made the optional declaration under CAT allowing individuals to submit 
communications to the CAT Committee.  Therefore, an individual may submit 
a contentious case to the African Court under the Protocol, alleging a violation 
by the Lesotho government, even though that individual could not submit a 
communication to the CAT Committee.  Compare Protocol to the African 
Charter, supra note 1, art. 3, and Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. 
GAOR, 39th Sess., 93d mtg. art. 21(1984), http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm. 
 268. See, e.g., MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 98 (1998) (discussing the omission of 
a petitions procedure in the Covenant).  The process of adopting an Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant, providing for the right of petition, is ongoing.  See 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Mar. 14, 2004, UN Doc. E/CN/.4/2004/44 
(most recent report of the open–ended working group investigating this issue), 
http://ods–dds–gva.unog.ch/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/120/29/PDF/G0412029 
.pdf?OpenElement).   
 269. This interpretation does not entirely solve the problem.  For example, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by all the state 
parties to the Protocol, and, thus, could potentially be interpreted by the Afri-
can Court.   
 270. See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Pro-
tocol, supra note 56. 
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making an optional declaration, the extended jurisdiction of 
Article 3 applies only to those states.271  Otherwise, cases must 
first be presented to the Commission using its normative legal 
framework, which is the African Charter; only violations of the 
African Charter may be brought before the African Commis-
sion.272  Moreover, even if those cases are referred to the Court 
(either before, during or after the Commission’s consideration), 
it is questionable whether the African Commission’s referral 
should be restricted to the legal basis of its findings.273  In my 
opinion, referral does not extend the initial legal basis under 
which the case was submitted.  The extended jurisdictional ba-
sis, with its concomitant problems, will only arise in a relatively 
small percentage of cases.274  Individuals bringing cases directly 
before the African Court should have a much wider array of 
substantive rights to invoke than they had under the Charter.275   
B.  Legal Aid  
Although the Protocol provides that parties may be repre-
sented by lawyers of their choice,276 this “choice” may not be 
available to all individuals and NGOs if they lack the financial 
resources to retain their own lawyer.  Although the Protocol 
adds that free legal representation “may be provided where the 
interests of justice so require,”277 the use of passive voice, which 
  
 271. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 3. 
 272. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 56(2).  But see Media Rights Agenda 
v. Nigeria, Communication 224/98, 14th Ann. Activity Report, supra note 76, at 
57 (Commission found Nigeria in violation of numerous Charter provisions 
and  “Principle 5 of the UN basic Principles on the Independence of the Judi-
ciary”). 
 273. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 6(1), 6(3), 8. 
 274. See, e.g., Österdahl, supra note 266, at 137 (drawing the distinction 
between arts. 60 and 61 of the Protocol, which entitle the Commission to draw 
inspiration, and art. 3, which provides a legal basis for application).  
 275. Unfortunately, the travaux préparatoires of the Protocol do not provide 
an explanation for the African Court’s expansive jurisdiction, leaving one to 
speculate that it may have been influenced by a misreading of Articles 60 and 
61 of the African Charter.  The Protocol’s drafters also may have been influ-
enced by the notion that all possible means should be brought to bear on 
states to ensure that their human rights obligations are observed.   
 276. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(2) (stating 
that “[a]ny party to a case shall be entitled to be represented by a legal repre-
sentative of the party’s choice”). 
 277. Id.  
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identifies neither the subject or the object of such legal aid, 
seems deliberate and implies that it may not be available to all 
parties.  Because legal aid must contend for the African Court’s 
limited resources, either a special fund should be established to 
provide legal aid or states should assume responsibility for pro-
viding it.  Neither possibility is prohibited by the Protocol, and 
the African Court itself should administer this as a regular part 
of its budget.  The cost may not be great, as the text does not 
suggest that free representation should extend to local reme-
dies, yet, many potential litigants will fail solely for lack of 
funds.278  What role should the inability to exhaust local reme-
dies, due to financial constraints, play in the African Court’s 
decision on admissibility, especially in a case of direct access?279  
Bringing a case before the African Court is bound to be an ex-
pensive exercise, as it would include the cost of a senior lawyer 
and travel expenses.280   
A passive interpretation of the Protocol leaves open the possi-
bility that states may also benefit from legal aid.  This should 
be applied only in exceptional circumstances, as states normally 
have their own legal staffs.  Other factors to consider when 
awarding legal aid include at which stage of the proceedings 
application should be made and whether it should be made to 
judges or the Registrar.  Additionally, since individuals should 
not be expected to pay costs incurred by governments, the Afri-
can Court must decide whether to award costs.281  These aspects 
  
 278. See, e.g., C. F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
327–32 (2004).   
 279. See Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 
46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opin-
ion OC–11/90, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 11, para. 31 (Aug. 10, 1990) 
(finding that indigents need not “exhaust the relevant domestic remedies” 
before appealing directing to the Inter–American Commission when a right 
granted under the American Convention is involved).   
 280. The practice in most international tribunals, including the African 
Commission, is that complainants are represented by lawyers.  This would, in 
the absence of legal aid, impose significant financial burdens on complainants.   
 281. See, e.g., Murray, Comparison Between the African and European 
Courts, supra note 5, at 214.   
File: Viljoen Macro 122704.doc Created on: 12/27/2004 3:47 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:48 PM 
2004] HUMAN RIGHTS COURT 51 
need to be clarified in the Rules of Procedure or in an adden-
dum thereto, as in the case of the European Court.282   
C. Amici Curiae 
Scholar Abdelsalam Mohamed has highlighted the role of 
amicus curiae briefs in the European and Inter-American 
Courts.283  In the Inter-American system, the competence of the 
Inter-American Court to hear any person whose evidence, 
statement or opinion it deems to be useful serves as the legal 
basis for allowing such briefs.284  In the era before Protocol No. 
11, the European Court permitted third-party participation in 
proceedings based on a similarly-worded provision in its Rules 
of Court.285  As a result, NGOs with particular expertise, such as 
Amnesty International, Article 19 and America Watch, and 
academics or academic institutions that focus on the issues be-
fore courts have assisted these two Courts.286  Mohamed argues 
that the Nouakchott Draft Protocol supports an inference that 
the extension of this possibility to the African Court should be 
adopted.287  The Nouakchott Draft Protocol differs from the 
adopted text in an important respect in that the Protocol does 
not include the phrase “and other representations.”288  This 
seems to suggest a restriction on evidence.  It is still debatable 
  
 282. Legal aid under the European system has been described as “very lim-
ited and means–tested at state level.”  Murray, Comparison Between the Afri-
can and European Courts, supra note 5, at 214–15.   
 283. Abdelsalam A. Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Hu-
man Rights Litigation Before the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Lessons From the European and Inter–American Courts of Human Rights, 8 
MICH. ST.–DCL J. INT’L L. 377 (1999).  
 284. Inter-American Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art 45(1). 
 285. 1992 Rules of European Court, supra note 233, at 277, R. 41(1).  See 
also Anthony Lester, Amici Curiae: Third Party Interventions before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN 
DIMENSION 341 (Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1988). 
 286. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Or-
ganizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611, 634–
37 (1994).  
 287. See Mohamed, supra note 283, at 379–80 (basing his inference on lan-
guage in the Nouakchott Draft Protocol). 
 288. Compare Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, art. 25(2) (stating 
that the Court “may receive written and oral evidence and other representa-
tions”), and Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 26(2) (similar 
provision, but Protocol lacks the phrase “other representation”).  
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whether the distinction between evidence and testimony is sig-
nificant, which leaves the door open for the Rules to include 
amicus curiae briefs as part of the term “testimony.”289   
The most persuasive rationale for third-party arguments is 
that they may assist the African Court by providing it with 
comprehensive legal arguments.290  A court with relatively mea-
ger resources should embrace opportunities to hear supplemen-
tary arguments.  However, such “friends of the Court” should 
refrain from stifling the voices of the parties, and hearing them 
should not become overly burdensome.  Therefore, the African 
Court should first receive and peruse arguments made by par-
ties, and then decide if third-party briefs make valuable contri-
butions.  The African Court may also decide to consider such 
arguments only in written form.   
D. Advisory Opinions: Role for NGOs 
Even if an advisory opinion is not binding on the party re-
questing it, it may have profound persuasive force and interna-
tional repercussions.291  Advisory opinions have been used ex-
tensively and effectively in the Inter-American system.292  Dur-
ing its fledgling years, the Inter-American Court dealt with 
more advisory than contentious cases, primarily because the 
Inter-American Commission and respondent states were reluc-
tant to submit contentious cases to the Inter-American Court.293  
Former Inter-American Court Judge Thomas Buergenthal 
claims that this development was fortunate because it provided 
the Inter-American Court with a chance to consolidate itself, as 
  
 289. Evidence is defined as “something that tends to prove; ground for be-
lief,” while testimony is defined as “a declaration or statement made under 
oath or affirmation by a witness in a court, often in response to questioning, to 
establish a fact.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 493, 1480 (4th 
ed. 1999). 
 290. Mohamed, supra note 283, at 382–83.  
 291. Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter–American Court of 
Human Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of International Human Rights 
Law, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 241, 242 (2002).   
 292. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 80.  
 293. See David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-
American Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 
23 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998) (noting the reluctance 
of the Commission to make referrals and the small number of states accepting 
the African Court’s optional jurisdiction).   
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governments in “fragile emerging democracies” found it “easier 
to give effect to an advisory opinion than to comply with a con-
tentious decision in a case they lost.”294  The situation faced by 
the Inter-American Court is clearly analogous to Africa, where 
democracy is still seeking a strong foothold.295   
Three entities may request advisory opinions and claim 
standing before the African Court: states, the AU and its or-
gans, and a broader and undefined group called “African or-
ganisations.”296  As in the Inter-American system, state parties 
may make such requests;297 most of the Inter-American Court’s 
advisory opinions were given at the request of state parties.  
States requesting an advisory opinion from the African Court 
need not have ratified the Protocol, therefore, this aspect of the 
African Court’s jurisdiction is open to non-state parties.298   
The AU and any of its organs may also request advisory opin-
ions.299  Such requests could be duplicative, however, as the Af-
rican Court of Justice, once formed, is to have jurisdiction over 
the interpretation and application of the AU Constitutive Act;300 
the African Court of Justice will also have advisory jurisdic-
tion.301  Reading the two protocols together, it would seem that 
the AU should refer matters with a human rights focus to the 
African Court of Human Rights.  Although allowing the AU and 
  
 294. Thomas Buergenthal, The European and Inter-American Human 
Rights Courts: Beneficial Interaction, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 123, 131 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds., 2000).   
 295. See Österdahl, supra note 266, at 141 (noting that the “softer, less 
obliging channel of advisory opinions” may be more applicable outside a “well–
functioning democratic environment characterised by the rule of law”).   
 296. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 4(1). 
 297. Id.  See also American Convention, supra note 181, art. 64 (stating that 
a member state may request an advisory “opinion regarding the compatibility 
of any of its domestic laws with ... international instruments”).  
 298. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 3, 5 (states 
must be parties to the African Charter).   
 299. Id. art. 4(1).   
 300. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 89, art. 26.  See Udombana, Toward 
the African Court, supra note 1, at 78.   
 301. Protocol of the Court of Justice, supra note 207, art. 44(1) (provides 
that AU organs, as well as a “Regional Economic Community” may request 
advisory opinions “on any legal question”).  See also id. art. 20 (expansive 
formulation of Article 44(1) should be read with Article 20, which provides 
that the Court “shall have regard to” the broad category of “international trea-
ties”). 
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other African intergovernmental organizations to request advi-
sory opinions may seem problematic because they are not par-
ties to the Protocol or the African Charter and, thus, cannot be 
held accountable for failure to comply with the Protocol’s provi-
sions,302 the fact that they all subscribe to African Charter’s 
standards and goals makes it less so.  Therefore, the African 
Human Rights Court should be the judicial institution to advise 
about human rights matters related to policy development and 
formulation. 
Any “African organisation recognised by the AU” may also 
request an advisory opinion from the African Human Rights 
Court.303  In parts of the Protocol, the terms “African intergov-
ernmental organisations” and “NGOs with observer status be-
fore the Commission” have been used.304  Thus, the word “or-
ganisation” is a generic term, and encompasses both intergov-
ernmental and non-governmental bodies.  However, the organi-
zations must be “African;”305 an “African organisation” does not 
include NGOs enjoying observer status with the African Com-
mission because members of that group need not be African.  
The organization must also be “recognised by the AU.”306  All 
African NGOs enjoying observer status with the African Com-
mission should qualify as such; observer status should be re-
garded as a form of recognition by the AU.  Regional economic 
arrangements such as ECOWAS and the Southern Africa De-
velopment Community (SADC), which are part of the AEC re-
gional economic arrangements and building blocks of the AU, 
also qualify.  Other African organizations should also be able to 
request advisory opinions, so long as their work is associated 
with the AU or AEC.   
It is possible that NGOs requesting advisory opinions will try 
to use the procedure to bring disputes against states that have 
not accepted the African Court’s contentious jurisdiction.  
States and AU organs may also attempt to abuse the African 
Court’s advisory procedure by cloaking contentious cases as re-
  
 302. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 4(1) (provides that 
the OAU, any of its organs “or any African organization recognized by the 
OAU” may approach the Court with a request for an advisory opinion).   
 303. Id.  
 304. Id. arts. 5(1)(e), 5(3) (respectively). 
 305. Id. art. 4(1). 
 306. Id. art. 5(3). 
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quests for advisory opinions.  The potential for abuse by NGOs 
should not be overstated, however, as the African Court’s advi-
sory opinions are only advisory and, thus, remain non-
binding.307  
Advisory opinions may be requested on a legal matter relat-
ing to the Charter or “any other relevant human rights instru-
ments.”308  The subject matter jurisdiction for advisory opinions 
is broader than for contentious cases and includes questions 
concerning any human rights “instrument,” those both non-
binding and declaratory and those open to ratification and bind-
ing.  Any conceivable human rights document may be invoked, 
as long as it is relevant.  However, even though the African 
Court’s advisory subject matter jurisdiction is much broader 
than its contentious jurisdiction, it is less controversial because 
of its non-binding nature.   
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Other issues, such as the seat of the Court, the election of 
judges, the adoption of Rules of Procedure and the importance 
of resources, are likely to affect the success of individual cases 
before the African Court.   
A. Seat of the Court 
The seat of the African Court is not specified in the Protocol.  
Determination of the seat is left to the AU Assembly once the 
Protocol enters into force.309  The seat must be “from among 
State parties” to the Protocol.310  The seat of the African Com-
mission, Banjul, presented numerous problems for individuals, 
particularly because of its inaccessibility and the cost of trans-
portation to reach it.311  Inadequate infrastructure and lack of 
immediate access to the media and important role-players also 
cause difficulties.312  Therefore, the problems arising from the 
choice of Banjul as the African Commission’s seat should be 
avoided.  The state in which the African Court is based should 
  
 307. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 29.   
 308. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 4(1). 
 309. Id. art. 25. 
 310. Id. art. 25 (1). 
 311. ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 186 (alluding to these factors).   
 312. See generally Danish Centre for Human Rights, supra note 80.   
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have: (1) political and economic stability; (2) a sustained record 
of democracy, good governance and domestic human rights pro-
tection; (3) a developed infrastructure, a travel hub and regular 
connections to international travel routes; (4) institutions of 
higher learning equipped and willing to support the Court and 
its Registry; (5) a good record of submitting state reports and 
other forms of cooperation (such as implementing recommenda-
tions) with the African Commission and UN treaty bodies; and 
(6) international media, diplomatic corps and international or-
ganizations.  Ultimately, however, the decisive factor will be the 
state party’s commitment to undertake the financial and politi-
cal responsibilities of housing the African Court. 
Other factors may also have to be considered.  Symbolism 
may play a role; for example, inviting venues include Dakar (Ile 
Gôreé, emphasizing the post-colonial aspect), Cape Town (Rob-
ben Island, as a post-apartheid icon linked to the struggle 
against “foreign domination”) and Kigali (in post-genocide 
Rwanda).  Another factor is the distance between the seats of 
the African Commission and the African Court.  The European 
model, when it still functioned with dual institutions, provided 
for a joint seat at Strasbourg.313  In the Inter-American system, 
the seats of the Court and Commission are separated by vast 
distances–San José, Costa Rica, and Washington D.C.314  The 
geographic separation of these two institutions may account, at 
least partly, for the initial lack of cooperation between the In-
ter-American Commission and Court.  In any event, discussions 
concerning the African Court’s location may prompt reconsid-
eration of the Commission’s location.   
B. Election of Judges  
The African Court will consist of eleven judges elected for six-
year terms.315  Unlike the European system, not every state 
  
 313. 1992 Rules of European Court, supra note 233, at 265, R. 15. 
 314. Statute of the Inter-American Court, supra note 155, art. 3.; Statute of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 1979, O.A.S. Res. 447, 
9th Sess., art. 16, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic15.htm. 
 315. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 15.  Judges may be 
re-elected once, and to ensure continuity only three judges of the initial group 
will serve a full six-year term.  Four judges will serve only two years and four 
others will serve only four years.  Judges are allocated terms in accordance 
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party will be represented on the African Court.316  In fact, a 
judge may not hear cases involving his or her own state.317  The 
elected judges choose their own President and Vice-President 
for a once-renewable term of two years.318  As the only judge 
serving on a full-time basis and residing at the seat of the Afri-
can Court,319 the President is likely to play a very important role 
in the establishment and running of the African Court.  The 
President will also work closely with the Registrar, whom the 
African Court appoints to this full-time position, and who also 
resides at the seat.320 
The phases of nomination and election of judges should be 
clearly distinguished.  Only state parties to the Protocol may 
nominate candidates.321  When the Secretary General calls for 
nominations, each member state may nominate three individu-
als, two of whom must be nationals of that state.322  Thus, they 
may also nominate candidates from AU member states that 
have not accepted the Protocol.323  A list of these names is sent 
  
with lots drawn by the Chair of the AU commission (previously the OAU Sec-
retary General).  Id. 
 316. See id. art. 14(2); LCHR’s Chart Showing Gender and Regional Balance 
in Elections to International Courts and Tribunals, at www.humanrights-
first.org/International_justice/icc/election/judges_gender_region_040303.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004). 
 317. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 22.  The exclusion of 
judge–nationals from hearings also differs from the ICJ’s appointment of ad 
hoc judges from states involved in disputes before it.  See Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 31, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993,http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute. 
htm.  See also Krisch, supra note 1, at 717 (noting that the Protocol position 
improves the perception of impartiality and may “represent a reaction to the 
problems of the Commission in this respect”).  The intended impartiality of 
the African Court’s judiciary is underscored throughout the Protocol.  See 
Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 11(1) (judges are “elected in 
an individual capacity”); id. art. 16 (judges must take an oath to “discharge 
their duties impartially and faithfully”). 
 318. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 21(1).   
 319. Id. art. 21(2).   
 320. Id. art. 24.  Unlike the Protocol, the African Charter provides that the 
OAU Secretary General shall appoint the Secretary to the African Commis-
sion.  The Commission’s dissatisfaction with its inability to appoint or dismiss 
its Secretary may have influenced the Protocol’s appointment provision for the 
African Court.  Compare id., and African Charter, supra note 1, art. 41. 
 321. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 12(1).   
 322. Id. arts. 12(1), 13(1). 
 323. Id. art. 12(1).   
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to the members of the Assembly thirty days before its next ses-
sion.324 
The Assembly, composed of fifty-three states, chooses the 
judges from those nominated.325  This may seem inadvisable, but 
leaving the decision to the AU makes sense because any of the 
other states may become a state party during the general term 
of tenure, and should have some say in the composition of the 
African Court.326  Furthermore, the African Court is an AU in-
stitution, and the AU takes political responsibility for its func-
tioning and the enforcement of its judgments.  The African 
Court and AU are intertwined in many ways: the African Court 
is dependent on the AU for its budget,327 the AU Assembly has 
the final say over the removal of judges from office328 and de-
termines, and may change, the African Court’s seat,329 the Court 
reports annually to the Assembly, specifying instances of non-
compliance,330 and the monitoring judgments is the Assembly’s 
responsibility.331  Thus, the Assembly has a vested political and 
financial interest in and responsibility for the African Court.  In 
any event, this methodology is also followed for the election of 
members to the African Commission.332  
The election process is guided by the qualifications of the can-
didate and the need for a balanced judiciary.333  Candidates 
must be AU nationals, not necessarily of state parties, must be 
“jurists” by profession, with specific and demonstrated human 
  
 324. Id. art. 13(2).  At its third ordinary session, the AU decided to hold 
sessions no longer annually, but twice a year. Assembly of the African Union, 
3rd Ann. Sess., AU Doc.Assembly/AU/Dec.53 (III) (July 6–8, 2004). 
 325. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 14; List of Countries 
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol, supra note 56.  
 326. In the Inter-American system, state parties to the American Conven-
tion nominate and elect judges.  American Convention, supra note 181, art. 
53.  In Europe, before Protocol No. 11, the Council of Europe, its Court and 
Parliamentary Assembly respectively, nominated and elected judges (one 
judge per state).  European Convention, supra note 17, art. 39(1). 
 327. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 32.    
 328. Id. art. 19(2).      
 329. Id. art. 25.   
 330. Id. art. 31.     
 331. Id. art. 29(2).     
 332. All fifty-three AU members have been state parties to the African 
Charter since 1999, so this distinction is no longer relevant.  List of Countries 
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol, supra note 56. 
 333. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 11, 14. 
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rights expertise and experience (“competence and experience in 
the field of human rights”) and should be “of high moral charac-
ter.”334  Additionally, there must be “adequate gender represen-
tation” (not “equal,” which, in any event, is impossible in a court 
of eleven judges),335 as well as representation of geographical 
areas and Africa’s “principal legal traditions.”336  This addresses 
a recurring problem with the election of members to the African 
Commission as there was occasionally overrepresentation or 
non-representation of a region.  The Protocol correctly links geo-
graphic concerns to varying legal traditions.337  It would, for 
instance, not make sense to ensure proportional representation 
for the West African region by electing two judges from Anglo-
phone/common law countries.  While the regional representa-
tion requirement may be met if each of the five regions is “rep-
resented” by at least one judge on the African Court,338 greater 
attention should be paid to insuring that each legal tradition is 
represented, such as the Islamic/Shari’ah-based system, the 
  
 334. Id. art. 11(1).     
 335. Id. arts. 14(3), 12(2) (Article 12 requires that “due consideration” be 
given to “adequate gender representation.”).  See also AU Constitutive Act, 
supra note 89, art. 4(1) (defining the promotion of gender equality as one of 
the AU’s principles).  Women are underrepresented in international law, in-
cluding international judicial bodies; at the beginning of 2003, only eleven of 
the forty–three judges on the European Court were women.  See INTERIGHTS, 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (2003), at http://www.nchr. 
gr/downloads/Judicial_Appointments_to_ECHR.pdf.  There has never been 
more than one woman of the seven judges on the Inter–American Court.  See 
generally Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at http://www. 
corteidh.or.cr/general_ing/composition.html (providing the names of both cur-
rent and former judges).  It appears that female participation in quasi–
judicial bodies is more generally accepted; the African Commission has seen 
its female representation increase from zero out of eleven in 1993 to five out of 
eleven in 2003, including its President (Commissioner Sawadogo).  See gener-
ally African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at http://www. 
achpr.org/english/_info/members_en.html.  Two of the seven members of the 
Inter–American Commission were women at the beginning of 2003.  See gen-
erally InteriAmerican Commission on Human Rights, at www.cidh.org.   
 336. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 14(2).    
 337. Id. 
 338. The nineteen ratifying states cover all five regions—north (two), west 
(seven), east (three, including the island states of Comoros and Mauritius), 
central (five) and south (two).  See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Rati-
fied/Acceded to the Protocol, supra note 56. 
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common law system, the civil law system, and the particular 
brand of mixed “Roman-Dutch law” in Southern Africa.339  The 
candidates’ personal profiles should be such as to insure that 
expertise of traditional African customary law and tradition is 
also represented.340   
Individuals have a role in the domestic nomination process 
and the AU’s election process.  NGOs and individuals in state 
parties should involve themselves by nominating competent 
persons internally or by challenging incompetent or inappropri-
ate candidates at the domestic level.  For this to be possible, AU 
member states should ensure that the domestic nomination 
process is transparent and that a free exchange of information 
is readily available.  These efforts should extend to the election 
process, which should be supported by civil society in all AU 
member states.  It is important that the process be as transpar-
ent as possible, with the curriculum vitae of a candidate sub-
jected to public scrutiny.  The Protocol provides that a judge’s 
position is incompatible with “any activity that might interfere 
with the independence or impartiality” of judges.341  Although 
the Rules of Procedure will prescribe what these activities are, 
efforts should be made to prevent the election of candidates who 
clearly elude these criteria.342  Such vigilance is necessary be-
cause judges have the competence to draft Rules of Procedure343 
and, once elected, may do so to suit their personal ends.   
C. Adoption of Rules of Procedure 
The African Court “shall draw up its Rules and determine its 
procedures.”344  As the discussion above makes clear, these rules 
  
 339. See generally J.N.D. Anderson, The Adaptation of Muslim Law in Sub-
Saharan Africa, in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 149 (Hilda 
Kuper & Leo Kuper eds., 1965) (discussing Islamic/Shari’ah–based systems); 
1–2 READINGS IN AFRICAN LAW (Eugene Cotran ed., 1970) (discussing common 
and civil law systems); Leslie Rubin, The Adaptation of Customary Family 
Law in South Africa, in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 196 
(Hilda Kuper & Leo Kuper eds., 1965) (discussing Roman–Dutch law). 
 340. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 14(2). 
 341. See id. arts. 18, 8.  
 342. Some Commissioners served as ambassadors for their countries in 
other African states, inviting the perception that they exercise bias in their 
decision-making.    
 343. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 33. 
 344. Id. art. 33.   
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may go a long way to strengthen or weaken the position of indi-
viduals before the African Court.  As suggested by the Proto-
col,345 the African Court should consult the African Commission 
on numerous issues.  Such discussions, to be held soon after the 
inauguration of the judges, may result in amendments to the 
Commission’s Rules of Procedure.346   
The Commission’s Rules of Procedure should clarify under 
which circumstances it may submit cases to the African Court.  
There are a number of possibilities.  First, the Rules could pro-
vide for direct submission to the African Court, without consid-
eration by the African Commission, under exceptional circum-
stances of immediate importance.  Second, the Rules could al-
low the African Commission to submit a case after declaring it 
admissible and conducting fact-finding.  If this possibility is 
accepted, the Commission’s Rules of Procedure must incorpo-
rate a clear fact-finding procedure.  However, room must be left 
for the African Court to deal with the factual issues.  Third, the 
Rules could determine which factors to account for when the 
African Commission refers a matter to the African Court after 
making a finding on the merits or after having amicably re-
solved the matter.  Obviously, the Court’s Rules of Procedure 
must correspond with all these provisions and grant individuals 
a clear right to be represented before it, either personally or 
through counsel.   
When parties before the African Court reach an amicable set-
tlement, the African Court must scrutinize the agreement for 
its compliance with human rights, and must formally adopt it 
as a judgment in order to enable implementation or monitor-
ing.347  Such judgments serve not only the interests of individual 
  
 345. Id. (providing that “[t]he Court shall consult the Commission as 
appropriate”). 
 346. See Badawi Elsheikh, supra note 1, at 258.   
 347. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 9.  A literal in-
terpretation of “in accordance with the provisions of the Charter” would re-
strict the Court’s competence to deal with settlements because the African 
Charter only provides for settlement in communications between inter–state 
parties; it is silent on settlement negotiations involving individuals.  African 
Charter, supra note 1, arts. 47–51.  Another interpretation of that phrase is 
that the settlement in any case before the Court must be human-rights-
friendly, or “in accordance with the (substance of the) provisions of the Char-
ter.”  See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 9.  See also Euro-
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parties before the African Court, but also the general interest of 
human rights protection.  The judgment should indicate the 
precise nature of action required by the state, such as the na-
ture of legislative amendments or the amount of compensation, 
and should specify a time period within which action must be 
taken.348   
The Commission’s Rules of Procedure should be amended to 
allow submission to the African Court, enabling the African 
Court to take provisional measures in urgent cases that have 
not yet been submitted to it for consideration.349  When a con-
tentious case is pending before the African Court, individuals 
should be allowed to present a request for provisional measures 
directly to the African Court.  They should also be allowed to 
present their views about state compliance.350  
Third-party arguments (amicus curiae briefs) should be al-
lowed, but only under suitable conditions.351  An emphasis on 
written submissions may, for example, ensure that the African 
Court only hears from those who set out views or authorities 
not covered by the parties or the African Commission.    
D. Importance of Resources 
The African Court’s establishment comes at a time of compet-
ing claims to limited resources.352  To a large extent, the AU 
  
pean Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, R. 44(2), 62(3), 38 I.L.M. 208, 
226, 234 (1998) [hereinafter Rules of Court].  
 348. See, e.g., Skoogström v. Sweden, 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1984) 
(dissenting opinion).   
 349. See supra Part II.A (discussing interim measures).     
 350. See, e.g., Inter-American Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art. 
25(6) (“The beneficiaries of urgent measures or provisional measures ordered 
by the President may address their comments on the report made by the State 
directly to the Court.  The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights shall 
present observations to the State’s report and to the observations of the bene-
ficiaries or their representatives.”).  
 351. See, e.g., 1992 Rules of the European Court, supra note 233, R. 37(2) 
(“The President may ... invite or grant leave ... to any person concerned other 
than the applicant … to submit written comments ... on issues which he shall 
specify.”).  
 352. The AU’s financial resources have remained constant, but claims on its 
resources have increased because of the entry into force of a number of legal 
instruments, e.g., the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Eco-
nomic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, the Protocol Relat-
ing to the Peace and Security Council and the Protocol to the African Charter 
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Constitutive Act is only a framework document that allows for 
the adoption of detailed “Protocols” to establish institutional 
organs.353  The Constitutive Act stipulates such action with re-
spect to the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the 
African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the Afri-
can Investment Bank.354  The Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council’s functions and organization shall be determined “by 
the Assembly.”355  
When the AU was launched in 2002, few of its institutional 
components had been set up.356  At present, three institutions —
the Peace and Security Council, the Pan-African Parliament 
and the African Human Rights Court — are in the process of 
being established.357  All functional treaty bodies are developed 
through phases: negotiation, adoption, formal acceptance, entry 
into force, and operationalization.  The fifth phase of operation-
alization is sometimes underplayed, but it is of determinative 
importance.  Institutional mechanisms and procedures are only 
words on paper without the personnel, paper, printers, build-
ings and infrastructure to make them a reality.  Meager alloca-
tions of resources undermine independence.  Over the years, the 
OAU has suffered from problems of inadequate financing.  De-
spite numerous pleas by the OAU/AU Assembly that the neces-
  
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
 353. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 89, arts. 17(2), 18(2). 
 354. Id. arts. 17(2), 18(2), 19.    
 355. Id. art. 22(2).  
 356. Packer & Rukare, supra note 4, at 377. 
 357. See Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Commu-
nity Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Mar. 2, 2001 (entered into force 
Dec. 14, 2003), http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm.  The AU As-
sembly designated South Africa as the country to host the Pan-African Par-
liament.  Assembly of the African Union, Decision on The Launching and the 
Establishment of the Pan African Parliament, 3d Ord. Sess., AU Doc. Assem-
bly/AU/Dec.39 (III) (July 2004).  See also African Union, List of Countries 
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the Treaty Establish-
ing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan–African Parliament 
(46 states have become parties to the Protocol), at http://www.africa-
union.org/home/Welcome.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).  See also Protocol 
Relating to Peace and Security Council, supra note 63; African Union, List of 
Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (36 
states have become parties), at http://www.africa–union.org/home/Welcom 
e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).  
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sary resources should be allocated to the African Commission, 
funding for its activities is still lacking.358  Whatever modalities 
of coexistence are worked out, the fact remains that the African 
Court’s progress depends on a well-resourced and functional 
African Commission.  It should be recalled that the African 
Children’s Committee was also launched recently and has not 
yet been provided with a functional Secretariat.  Where institu-
tional proliferation meets financial need, there are bound to be 
casualties.    
A preliminary report on the financial implications of the Afri-
can Court already indicates that the Court will not have ade-
quate resources to meet its needs.359  The largest items are the 
projected salaries for the full-time President of the Court, the 
Registrar, a documents specialist, an accountant, two secretar-
ies and two drivers/assistants.360  It is by no means certain that 
a legal officer/researcher will be included in the budget.  By the 
same estimate, only $2,500 was budgeted for library books for 
the first year.361   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The dawn of a new century has witnessed manifold institu-
tional renewals at the regional level in Africa.  These institu-
tions, including the African Human Rights Court, should now 
be strengthened to ensure their growth, taking into account 
that the measure of their success will be the extent to which 
they are able to improve the lives of Africans.  The key to 
unleashing the African Court’s potential lies in the hands of the 
Court itself.   
  
 358. See, e.g., Annual Activities of the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights, AHG/Dec 126 (XXXIV), in African Union Declarations and 
Decisions Adopted by the Thirty–Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government (1998), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/Official_documents/Heads%20of%20State%20Summits/hog/8HoGA 
ssembly1998.pdf (“Reiterat[ing] its earlier decisions concerning the means for 
the functioning of the Commission.”). 
 359. Practical Issues Relating to the African Court, reprinted in HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 293.   
 360. Id. at 294.  
 361. Id. at 295.  
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First and foremost, the African Court must not become a 
white elephant — all institution and no cases to decide.362  To 
prevent this, the African Court must ensure that its Rules of 
Procedure allow access to individuals as extensively as the Pro-
tocol permits.  The African Court must cooperate with the Afri-
can Commission, whose Rules also need to be adapted.  To 
summarize, it is suggested here that the African Commission 
should usually decide on the admissibility of communications, 
but not on their merits.  Inadmissible cases should end at the 
Commission level.  With respect to admissible cases, the African 
Commission should engage in fact-finding and make efforts to 
negotiate a friendly settlement before submitting the case to the 
African Court.  In exceptional, urgent cases, the African Com-
mission may refer the case to the African Court without ad-
dressing it at all.  Such an approach will unlock the potential of 
the Court to supplement and strengthen the African Commis-
sion’s role in protecting individuals by ensuring that the defi-
ciencies inherent in the quasi-judicial nature of the Commission 
are overcome without causing more delay and cost.   
Allowing individuals the broadest possible standing before 
the African Court may well mean that the Commission’s protec-
tive role is restricted to admissibility findings in most cases and 
fact-finding in some cases.  Such an approach would enable the 
African Commission to focus on that part of its mandate ear-
marked as promotional but which also serves definite protective 
ends.  Its non-communication-based role should be enhanced by 
way of the resumption of on-site investigations, the improve-
ment and extension of the examination of state reports, promo-
tion and education of human rights generally and the Charter 
in particular, as well as proactive activities of Special Rappor-
teurs.  This is the best reading one could give to the require-
ment of “complementarity” between the Commission and 
Court.363  The African Commission is retained and reinforced as 
the AU’s main quasi-judicial human rights institution while 
and the African Court is developed as its main judicial institu-
tion.  This “complementarity” avoids duplication and delay.    
For all the attention devoted to continental judicial institu-
tions as manifestations of international human rights protec-
  
 362. A variant on “all dressed up and nowhere to go.” 
 363. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 8.   
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tion, their role and potential remain limited in comparison with 
national institutions.  National courts have to be the port of 
first call for individuals, yet they are frequently ignored.  There 
are beliefs, deeply embedded in many African states, that in-
form a reluctance to use law and courts to resolve disputes.  
Much of African life is “informal” and exists side-by-side with 
more “formal” aspects of life.364  Over-formalized legal systems 
reinforce this formality.  Reliance on the law may be fanciful in 
a context of low literacy, inaccessible sources (even legislation 
and law reports), a lack of lawyers and legal aid, and conditions 
of poverty or conflict overshadowing other concerns.  Legal 
norms are perceived as lacking legitimacy, as being transplants 
from some European metropolis, and as consisting of rules and 
norms that are juxtaposed unfavorably with traditional ways of 
life.  As an instrument of a highly centralized authority, law 
does not penetrate into vast rural areas, thus remaining remote 
and inaccessible.  Bureaucracies and courts are either dysfunc-
tional or function very slowly, and are steeped in corruption. 365 
International human rights law’s focus on “exhaustion of local 
remedies” takes too much for granted, and does not sufficiently 
account for these factors.  International tribunals face many 
problems: overly formal systems, intimidating procedures, lack 
of information, inaccessible texts, the perception that their deci-
sions reflect a regional consensus in which local specificities 
play only a minimal role, and the general remoteness of human 
rights ideology from the daily lives of individuals.  These prob-
lems are compounded in the African regional human rights sys-
tem.  Exercising a quasi-judicial mandate, an effective African 
Commission bolstered by recourse to the African Human Rights 
Court could go some distance in solving these difficulties. 
 
  
 364. See generally Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Protecting Human Rights in Plu-
ral Legal Systems of Africa: A Comparative Overview, in UNIVERSAL RIGHTS, 
LOCAL REMEDIES: IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF 
AFRICA 39, 58–60 (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im ed., 1999); Chidi Anselm Odinkalu 
& Ibrahima Kane, An Assessment of Information and Training Resources, in 
UNIVERSAL RIGHTS, LOCAL REMEDIES: IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICA 65, 68 (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im ed., 1999). 
 365. See, e.g., Ending the Graft in East Africa, DAILY NATION (Keyna), Oct. 
6, 2003, available at http://www.nationaudio.com?News/EastAfrica/06102003/ 
Opinion/Editorial106102003779.html.    
